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ABSTRACT
This dissertation introduces three essays on the effects of different public policies on
crime, education, and labor outcomes using quasi-experimental research designs. These
policies include targeting high-ranked members of criminal organizations to fighting orga-
nized crime and extending the school day.
In the first essay “Kingpin Approaches to Fighting Crime and Community Violence:
Evidence from Mexico’s Drug War," a joint work with Jason Lindo, we consider the effects
of the kingpin strategy, an approach to fighting organized crime in which law-enforcement
efforts focus on capturing the leaders of criminal organizations, on community violence
in the context of Mexico’s drug war. Newly constructed historical data on drug-trafficking
organizations’ areas of operation at the municipality level and monthly homicide data
allow us to control for a rich set of fixed effects and to leverage variation in the timing
of kingpin captures to estimate their effects. This analysis indicates that kingpin captures
cause large and sustained increases to the homicide rate in the municipality of capture and
smaller but significant effects on other municipalities where the kingpin’s organization has
a presence, supporting the notion that removing kingpins can have destabilizing effects
throughout an organization that are accompanied by escalations in violence.
In the second essay “The Short and Long Run Effects of Full-Time Schools on Aca-
demic Performance," I study the effect of extending the school day on student achievement
in Mexico, where more than 23,000 schools have extended their school day from 4.5 to
8 hours since 2007. I use the variation in the timing with which schools extended their
school day to estimate the impact of this intervention on students’ math and reading test
scores. I find evidence that extending the school day does not affect student achievement
the year of adoption; however it improves math and reading test scores by 5 percent of a
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standard deviation one year after adoption and the effect grows over time to 15 percent of
a standard deviation four years after adoption. I also find that the effects are more pro-
nounced in schools located in high-poverty communities and for students in lower grade
levels.
In the third essay “The Effect of Children’s Time in School on Mothers’ Labor Sup-
ply: Evidence from Mexico’s Full-Time Schools Program," a joint work with Francisco
Cabrera-Hernández, we examine the effect of the time children spend in school on female
labor supply. In particular, we investigate the degree to which extending the school day by
three and a half hours, in elementary schools, affects labor force participation, the number
of weekly hours worked, and the monthly earnings of females with elementary-school-age
children. To do so, we exploit within-individual variation in access to full-time schools and
a rotating panel of households that contains individual-level data on labor outcomes and
sociodemographic characteristics. Results from long-difference models show that extend-
ing the school day increases mothers’ labor supply at the extensive and intensive margins,
increasing mothers’ labor force participation by 7 percentage points and the number of
weekly hours worked by 2.4. Moreover, these increases are accompanied by a 47 percent
increase in monthly earnings.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Policy interventions are aimed at achieving certain goals, however, they might not pro-
duce the expected outcomes or they might cause unintended consequences. When evalu-
ating the success of policy interventions, it is very important to know both their intended
and unintended consequences in order to be able to determine their cost-effectiveness. To
this end, in this dissertation, I study the causal effects of two policy interventions on crime,
education, and labor outcomes using quasi-experimental research designs. These policies
include targeting high-ranked members of criminal organizations and extending the school
day in developing countries.
Section 2 studies the causal effects of targeting high-ranked members of criminal or-
ganizations, also known as the kingpin strategy, on community violence in the context
of the war on drugs in Mexico. We focus on homicides, in particular, which have been
shown to have far reaching consequences for Mexican communities. For example, recent
papers have documented that this form of violence has deleterious effects on economic
conditions (Velasquez 2015; Montoya 2016), human capital accumulation (Brown and
Velasquez 2016), and infant health (Brown 2016). Proponents of the kingpin strategy ar-
gue that removing a leader weakens an organization through its effect on its connections,
its reputation, and by creating disarray in the ranks below, and that this may in turn re-
duce the organization’s level of criminal activity. Detractors, however, point out that this
strategy may increase violence as lower ranked members maneuver to succeed the elim-
inated leader and rival groups attempt to exploit the weakened state of the organization.
Given sound logic underlying both types of arguments, there is a clear need for empirical
research on the subject. We find that the capture of a drug-trafficking-organization (DTO)
leader in a municipality increases its homicide rate by 61 percent in the six months follow-
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ing the capture and that this effect is highly persistent into subsequent periods. Consistent
with the notion that the kingpin strategy causes widespread destabilization throughout an
organization, we also find significant effects (of the same sign but smaller in magnitude)
on other municipalities where a captured leader’s DTO has a presence. Moreover, we find
evidence of spatial displacement as captures appear to reduce the homicide rate for mu-
nicipalities that neighbor a municipality of capture but where the captured leader’s DTO
does not have a presence.
Section 3 analyzes the causal effects of extending the school day, in primary education,
on academic performance. Policies extending the school day have become more and more
popular during the last two decades. The motivation behind these policies is that more
time in the classroom should translate into better learning outcomes. However, there is an
ongoing debate in the education literature over whether lengthening the school day in fact
improves academic performance. On the one hand, those who expect large positive ef-
fects argue that longer school days provide students with more time for learning, a deeper
coverage of the academic curricula, and more time for any given task. On the other hand,
those expecting small or even negative effects argue that students tend to waste time, de-
crease effort, get exhausted, and have less time for informal learning and other recreational
activities (Patall et. al., 2010). Then, it is very important to document both the sign and
the magnitude of this type of intervention. The main results indicate that extending the
school day does not affect test scores the year of adoption; however, it increases students’
math and reading test scores by 14.7 percent and 15.6 percent of a standard deviation,
respectively, four year following adoption. These results also suggest that the first year of
implementation is crucial for teachers and students to learn how to utilize the additional
time more efficiently.
Section 4 considers the causal effects of extending the school day on mothers’ labor
supply. Women’s labor supply in developing countries heavily depends on their fertility
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decisions, and specifically, on how much they are time- and budget- constrained due to
childrearing and the alternative costs of childcare institutions. Thus, the availability and
affordability of childcare centers are important for women to increase their labor market
participation while their children are still growing up. Our main results indicate that longer
school-days increase mothers’ labor supply at the extensive and intensive margins, increas-
ing mothers’ labor force participation by 7 percentage points and the number of worked
hours per week by 2.4. Moreover, these increases in labor supply are accompanied by a 47
percent average increase in earnings. Policies extending the school day have the potential
not only to improve children’s welfare and school outcomes, but also mothers’ labor sup-
ply and the available income at home, improving overall welfare, especially, for the most
vulnerable sectors of the population.
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2. KINGPIN APPROACHES TO FIGHTING CRIME AND COMMUNITY
VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE FROM MEXICO’S DRUG WAR
2.1 Introduction
The two main reasons for waging war on drugs are to reduce societal costs associated
with drug abuse and to reduce societal costs associated with the drug trade. The former in-
cludes effects on health, productivity, violent behavior, and broader impacts on health care
and public assistance programs. The latter includes violence involved with the enforce-
ment of contracts and turf battles, corruption, and activity in related “industries” that are
detrimental to welfare including protection rackets, human smuggling, kidnapping, pros-
titution, weapons trafficking, theft, etc.1 Naturally, the relative importance of these costs
depends on many factors, including the types of drugs involved, the level and spatial dis-
tribution of demand, and the organization of the supply network.2 Correspondingly, there
is significant heterogeneity in the approaches that have been used to wage war on drugs.
Demand-side approaches take the form of prevention efforts, treatment for abusers, and
increases in the cost of abuse through enforcement efforts and punishment. Supply-side
approaches, on the other hand, focus on disrupting operations by way of confiscation of
drugs and guns, targeting precursors, and arresting and punishing those involved in the
drug trade. Given resource constraints and the potential for unintended consequences,
policy-makers have to consider which of these policies to use and how intensely to use
them, highlighting the importance of understanding their costs and benefits. Towards this
end, this paper considers the effects of a particular supply-side approach that has played a
1See Miron and Zwiebel (1995), Miron (1999), and Owens (2014) for in-depth discussions of the manner
in which black markets can promote violence. Miron (1999) and Owens (2014) present empirical evidence
of such effects in analyses of homicides caused by prohibition in the United States.
2For example, the societal costs associated with the drug trade are most important in areas heavily in-
volved in the illegal production and distribution of drugs to be consumed elsewhere.
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prominent role in Mexico’s drug war—the targeting of high-ranked members of criminal
organizations, also known as the “kingpin strategy”—on community violence. We focus
on homicides, in particular, which have been shown to have far reaching consequences
for Mexican communities. For example, recent papers have documented that this form of
violence has deleterious effects on economic conditions (Velasquez 2015; Montoya 2016),
human capital accumulation (Brown and Velasquez 2016), and infant health (Brown 2016).
To put this study into context, it is important to note that most of the existing re-
search in this area focuses on the effects of drug-related interventions on drug abuse in
“downstream markets.” For example, researchers have shown that the Taliban stamping
out poppy production reduced heroin use in Australia (Weatherburn et al. 2003), that the
effect of Plan Colombia on the supply of Cocaine to the United States was relatively small
(Mejía and Restrepo 2013), that reductions in methamphetamine availability in the United
States in the mid-1990s reduced drug-related harms (Cunningham and Liu 2003; Dobkin
and Nicosia 2009; Cunningham and Finlay 2013), that U.S. state laws limiting the avail-
ability of Pseudoephedrine have not changed methamphetamine consumption (Dobkin,
Nicosia, and Weinberg 2013) nor have graphic advertising campaigns (Anderson 2010;
Anderson and Elsea 2015), and that substance-abuse treatment availability reduces mor-
tality and violent crime (Swensen 2015; Bondurant, Lindo, and Swensen 2016). Less
is known about the causal effects of “upstream interventions” on “upstream communi-
ties,” i.e., the effects of interventions on outcomes in areas where production, distribution,
and their associated costs are most relevant. In work closely related to our study, Dell
(2015) shows that drug-trade crackdowns in Mexico driven by close PAN mayoral victo-
ries increase the number of drug-trade-related homicides. Consistent with prior studies
highlighting how drug-related interventions can and have shifted the spatial distribution
of the drug trade in Afghanistan (Clemens 2008, 2013a, 2013b), Dell demonstrates that
crackdowns increase homicides in the municipalities where the efforts take place and that
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they also increase homicides in other municipalities to which trafficking is likely to be
diverted.3
This paper contributes to this literature by focusing explicitly on the effects of the king-
pin strategy, which has featured prominently in Mexico’s war on drugs and is one of the
hypothesized mechanisms underlying Dell’s results. Proponents of the kingpin strategy ar-
gue that removing a leader weakens an organization through its effect on its connections,
its reputation, and by creating disarray in the lower ranks, and that this may in turn reduce
the organization’s level of criminal activity. Detractors, however, point out that this strat-
egy may increase violence as lower ranked members maneuver to succeed the eliminated
leader and rival groups attempt to exploit the weakened state of the organization. Given
sound logic underlying arguments in favor of and against the kingpin strategy, there is a
clear need for empirical research on the subject. That said, there are two main empirical
challenges to estimating the effect of the kingpin strategy that are difficult to overcome.
First, policies targeting organized crime are almost always multifaceted, involving the
simultaneous use of various strategies. Mexico’s war on drugs is no exception—it also in-
volved various approaches implemented at various times with varying degrees of intensity,
which we discuss in greater detail in the next section. The second main challenge is that
the capture of a kingpin is fairly rare because, by definition, they are small in number. As
a result, establishing compelling evidence on the effect of eliminating kingpins in some
sense requires a series of case studies.
This study attempts to overcome these challenges by exploiting variation in the timing
with which different Mexican DTOs first had their leaders captured during Mexico’s drug
war and by using a newly constructed data set on the geographic distribution of DTOs
3In related work, Mejía and Restrepo (2013) estimate the causal effect of the drug trade on violence using
variation in the prominence of the drug-trade in Colombian municipalities based on land suitability for coca
cultivation. Also, Angrist and Kugler (2008) show that exogenous shocks to coca prices increase violence
in rural Colombian districts as groups fight over additional rents.
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over time. We focus on municipalities where these major captures occurred, neighboring
municipalities where the captured kingpin’s DTO had a presence, non-neighboring munic-
ipalities where the captured kingpin’s DTO had a presence, and neighboring municipalities
where the captured kingpin’s DTO did not have a presence. Municipalities without any
DTO presence serve as a comparison group. This approach allows us to abstract away
from the effects of broader policies and shocks (at the national and/or state level) and to
conduct several ancillary analyses to guide our interpretation of the results.
We find that the capture of a drug-trafficking-organization (DTO) leader in a munici-
pality increases its homicide rate by 61% in the six months following the capture and that
this effect is highly persistent into subsequent periods. Consistent with the notion that the
kingpin strategy causes widespread destabilization throughout an organization, we also
find significant effects (of the same sign but smaller in magnitude) on other municipalities
where a captured leader’s DTO has a presence. Moreover, we find evidence of spatial dis-
placement as captures appear to reduce the homicide rate for municipalities that neighbor
a municipality of capture but where the captured leader’s DTO does not have a presence.
These estimates can explain 31.8 percent of the increase in homicides in Mexico between
2006 and 2010.
Several pieces of evidence support a causal interpretation of these main results. First,
homicide rates in the municipalities of interest and in the comparison group track one
another closely prior to captures. That this is the case despite the fact that the war on drugs
began well before any of the captures we consider suggests that the empirical strategy can
separately identify the effects of kingpin captures in the broader context of the war on
drugs. We also show that the main results are driven by effects on the individuals most
likely to be directly involved in the drug trade: males and, more specifically, working-age
males. In an additional effort to show that the main results are not simply reflecting an
increase in propensities to engage in violence that coincides with captures in the relevant
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municipalities, we demonstrate that domestic violence and infant mortality do not respond
to these events in any systematic way that could explain the effects on homicides. Lastly,
we present evidence that operations themselves do not increase homicides in an analysis
of the first major operations of the war on drugs.
The most closely related study to our paper is Calderón et al. (2015). Though that
paper also considers the effects of kingpin captures during Mexico’s war on drugs on
homicides, our paper differs in several critical ways. First, whereas we demonstrate that
we have identified a good comparison group for the municipalities we define as being
“affected by kingpin captures,” municipalities they define as being affected by captures
of leaders exhibit a different trend from the synthetic control they use for comparison.4
Second, their empirical strategy analyzes all kingpin captures whereas we analyze the first
kingpin captures for each DTO. This distinction is important because the first kingpin
captures are plausibly exogenous, as we demonstrate in our empirical analysis, whereas
subsequent kingpin captures are not because it is likely that the initial captures contribute
to future captures. Stevens (1997) has demonstrated the importance of this sort of con-
sideration for analyses of job displacements where approaches that evaluate the effects of
all such events drastically understate the true effects on workers earnings. Third, our use
of detailed data on the geographic distribution of DTOs over time allows us to analyze
spillover effects of kingpin captures across the DTO, whereas they focus on spillover ef-
fects on neighboring municipalities. The importance of this difference is underscored by
our finding that the effects on more-distant municipalities account for 30 percent of the
effect on homicides. Fourth, we estimate how many homicides in total were caused by
the regime change involving the capture of kingpins, and the degree to which it explains
the dramatic increase in homicides in Mexico since 2006. Fifth, we present evidence of
the (non-)effects of military operations which, without our paper, would stand out as a
4See their Figure 3.
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major confounder for all other studies using the Mexican case study to try to understand
the effects of the kingpin strategy.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide
background on Mexico’s drug war, including a discussion of the events that precipitated
it, and the relevant DTOs. We then discuss our data and empirical strategy in sections
2.3 and 2.4, respectively. Section 2.5 presents a graphical analysis, the main results, and
supporting analyses. Lastly, Section 2.6 discusses the results and concludes.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Drug-trafficking in Mexico
In many ways, Mexico is ideally situated for producing and trafficking drugs. In ad-
dition to having a climate that allows for the growth of a diverse set of drugs, it shares
its Northern border with the world’s biggest consumer of drugs, the United States (CIA
2010).5 Drug trafficking has also been able to thrive in Mexico as a result of corruption and
weak enforcement of the law. The first DTOs were protected by the government, which
designated the areas in which each DTO would carry out its illegal activities. In the 1980s,
former police officer Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo—together with Rafael Caro Quintero
and Ernesto Fonseca Carrillo—founded the first Mexican Cartel: the Guadalajara Cartel.6
After the incarceration of his partners in 1985, Félix Gallardo kept a low profile and de-
cided to divide up the areas in which he operated.7 According to Grayson (2013), the gov-
ernment and the DTOs had unwritten agreements that “DTO leaders respected the territo-
ries of competitors and had to obtain crossing rights before traversing their turfs...criminal
5The United States is listed in The Wold Factbook as the world’s largest consumer of cocaine, Colombian
heroin, and Mexican heroin and marijuana.
6In addition with his connections with the Mexican government, Félix Gallardo was the first Mexican
drug trafficker to make connections with Colombian cartels, particularly he established a solid relation with
Pablo Escobar (leader of the Medellín Cartel).
7Joaquín Guzmán Loera and Ismael Zambada García were given the pacific coast area, the Arellano Félix
brothers received the Tijuana corridor, the Carrillo Fuentes family got the Ciudad Juárez corridor, and Juan
García Abrejo received the Matamoros corridor.
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organization[s] did not sell drugs in Mexico, least of all to children...and prosecutors and
judges would turn a blind eye to cooperative criminals."
In the 1990s, however, the environment became less stable as Guadalajara’s DTO splin-
tered into four separate DTOs8 and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) lost political
power (Astorga and Shirk 2010). Morales (2011) describes the late 1990s and early 2000s
as a period in which the DTOs became more independent, going from a regimen of po-
litical subordination to one of direct confrontation to dispute the control of territory. In
late 2005, a new DTO—La Familia—was established in the state of Michoacán followed
by a wave of violence.9 At the beginning of the war on drugs there were five DTOs (or
alliances of DTOs), Sinaloa/Beltrán-Leyva, Gulf, Tijuana, La Familia, and Juárez.
2.2.2 The War on Drugs
As shown in Panel A of Figure A.1, the homicide rate in Michoacán grew dramatically
between 2005 and 2006. That said, the national homicide rate continued to be extremely
stable at 0.8 per 100,000 residents per month (Figure A.1, Panel B). Nonetheless, eleven
days after the beginning of his term, the newly elected President Felipe Calderón declared
war on the DTOs on December 11, 2006, citing the increase in violence in Michoacán
as intolerable. While intellectuals highlighted his desire to have a significant reform as-
sociated with his presidency and the fact that he was born and raised in Michoacán, his
stated reasons for initiating the war was a concern “about the growth of drugs-related vio-
lence and the existence of criminal groups trying to take over control of entire regions.”10
Calderón’s strategy mainly consisted in a frontal attack led by members of the army, the
navy, and the federal police seeking the eradication of crops, the confiscation of drugs and
8After the arrest of Félix Gallardo in 1989 and his transfer to a the maximum security prison La Palma
in Mexico state, the leaders of the designated areas became independent and founded the second generation
of cartels (Sinaloa, Tijuana, Juárez, and Gulf).
9La Familia DTO is the metamorphosis of La Empresa which was a former branch of the Gulf Cartel.
10Financial Times interview, conducted January 17, 2007.
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guns, and the incarceration or killing of high ranked drug traffickers (the kingpin strategy).
The first operation took place in Michoacán on December 11, 2006, where more than 5000
army and federal police elements were deployed, and subsequent operations followed in
other parts of the country.
Mexico’s war on drugs was initially viewed as a great success. As shown in Figure A.2,
plotting data from 2001 to 2010, the national homicide rate dropped sharply in January
2007. The homicide rate jumped back up to 0.72 in March—not quite to its earlier level—
and then held steady for the following 9 months. Then, at the beginning of 2008 in a clear
break from trend, the homicide rate started to climb. It would continue to climb for several
years, reaching a level 150% higher than the pre-drug-war rate at the end of 2010.
This dramatic increase in violence in Mexico has drawn the attention of researchers
from different disciplines trying to explain its causes—most attribute this increase in vi-
olence to Calderón’s war on drugs. Different researchers have focused on the role of the
deployment of federal troops all across the country (Escalante 2011, Merino 2011), the
expiration of the U. S. Federal Assault Weapons Ban in 2004 (Chicoine 2011, Dube et
al.. 2012), the increase of cocaine seizures in Colombia (Castillo et al. 2012, Mejía and
Restrepo 2013), and the increased effort to enforce law initiated by the National Action
Party (PAN) mayors (Dell 2015).
Our research is motivated by the observation that the escalation of violence began in
January 2008, which was the month in which the first cartel leader was captured during
the war on drugs (Alfredo Beltrán Leyva). Naturally, many other things were going on in
Mexico and around the world at the same time, necessitating a more rigorous consideration
to be able to draw any strong conclusions about the effects of Mexico’s kingpin strategy.
In order to conduct such an analysis, we make use of newly constructed data on the geo-
graphic distribution of DTOs over time—in conjunction with several other data sets—to
consider the first captures of kingpins associated with each of the five DTOs in operation
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at the beginning of the war on drugs. These data and the associated identification strategy
are described in the next sections.
2.3 Data
Our analysis brings together data from several sources that ultimately yields a data set
at the municipality-month level, spanning January 2001 through December 2010.11 Our
primary outcome variable is based on monthly homicides at the municipality level, con-
structed using the universe of death certificates from the vital statistics of the National
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI).12 In order to put these data into per capita
rates, we use estimated municipality population counts from the National Council of Popu-
lation (CONAPO) and El Colegio de México (COLMEX), which are based on projections
from the Census of Population and Housing. While we note that drug-related homicides
are available from December 2006 to October 2011, we do not use these data out of con-
cern for the endogeneity of homicides being classified as “drug related” or “not drug re-
lated.”13
Our information on kingpin captures are from a compendium of press releases of the
Army (SEDENA), the Navy (SEMAR), and the Office of the Attorney General (PGR).
While these press releases contain a wealth of additional information, we focus on the
timing of the first capture of a leader or lieutenant from each of the DTOs during the war
on drugs. To put into perspective the types of kingpins we are considering, as the name
11San Ignacio Cerro Gordo and Tulum, which were created during this timespan, are not included in our
analysis.
12Less than one percent of death certificates with homicide as the presumed cause of death are missing
the municipality of occurrence. These observations are not used in our analysis.
13In particular, we might be especially concerned that events related to the war on drugs would heighten
attention to drug-related violence and thus increase the propensity for homicides to be classified as drug
related. Alternatively, a desire to influence the public perception regarding the success of the war on drugs
could cause a reduction in the probability that homicides are classified as drug related. As we are interested
in violence and not in the way that violence is classified, we believe it prudent to use an approach that
abstracts away from such issues though we acknowledge that similar biases could arise if events related to
the war on drugs affect the probability that deaths are classified as homicides as opposed to being due to
other causes.
12
implies, leaders are at the very highest level of the DTO. Lieutenants are immediately
below leaders in the DTO organization. As a practical matter, we classify an event as
a capture of a DTO leader when a press release indicates that the individual was a head
(or one of the heads) of a DTO and identify an event as a capture of a DTO lieutenant
when a press release indicates that the individual was a leader of a DTO in some state or
region. While these press releases also allow us to identify the capture of lower-level king-
pins, such as plaza bosses who control a single municipality, our analysis of such captures
(not shown) suggested that they are not as convincingly exogenous as the first captures of
higher-level kingpins. As such, we do not consider such events and our estimates can thus
be interpreted as identifying the effects of high-level kingpin captures.
As shown in Table A.1, there is significant variation in the timing with which high-level
kingpins were captured for the five DTOs in operation at the beginning of the war on drugs.
The first took place on August 29th, 2007—eight months after the war on drugs began—
when Juan Carlos de la Cruz Reyna, a lieutenant in the Gulf DTO was captured. The other
four DTOs (Sinaloa-Beltrán-Leyva, Tijuana, Juárez, and La Familia) first had top level
leaders captured during the war on drugs at various times between January and December
of 2008.14 Juan Carlos de la Cruz Reyna was considered a main link between the Gulf
DTO and to Colombian DTOs; he was responsible for receiving shipments of drugs in
Tampico and Northern Veracruz and transferring them to the border areas of Matamoros
and Nuevo Laredo, from where they were smuggled into the United States. Alfredo Bel-
trán Leyva (captured January 21, 2008) was considered one of the main leaders of the
Beltrán-Leyva DTO; he directed operations in the states of Sinaloa, Sonora, Chihuahua,
Durango, Jalisco, and Nayarit, and was in charge of the two assassin groups known as “Los
Pelones” and “Los Güeros.” Pedro Sanchez Arras (captured May 13, 2008) of the Juárez
DTO was considered one of the top lieutenants in the organization and directed operations
14Sinaloa and Beltrán-Leyva DTOs were allied before the drug war commenced.
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in Chihuahua. Eduardo Arellano Félix (captured October 25, 2008) led the Tijuana DTO
with his nephew, Luis Fernando Sanchez Arellano. Alberto Espinoza Barrón (captured
December 29, 2008) was a lieutenant in the La Familia DTO; he coordinated the receipt of
drugs from South America at the Port of Lazaro Cardenas and the subsequent trafficking
to the United States.15
We use newly available historical data on the municipalities of operation for each DTO,
the construction of which is described in detail in Coscia and Rios (2012). Briefly, the data
was constructed using a MOGO (Making Order using Google as an Oracle) framework for
selecting the most reliable subset of web information to collect information on relation-
ships between sets of entities (DTOs and municipalities in this case). It uses indexed web
content (e.g., online newspapers and blogs) and various queries to identify DTOs’ areas
of operation at the municipality level between 1990 and 2010.16 To avoid concerns about
endogeneity, we define areas of operation using only data before the war on drugs began
(2004–2006).17 Moreover, we take a conservative approach and specify that a DTO had a
presence in a municipality if the municipality was an “area of operation” for the DTO in
any of these three years. Figure A.3 maps out the distribution of the DTOs based on this
definition. One important takeaway from this figure—which we exploit in our empirical
analysis—is that a large share of Mexico has no DTO presence (or a DTO presence that is
too weak or inactive to be picked up using Coscia and Rios’ approach). Table A.1 reports
the number of municipalities that are associated with each DTO presence and the fraction
of the total Mexican population residing in these municipalities. These measures of influ-
ence are consistent with the notion that “the Gulf Cartel was considered the most powerful
15Details on Juan Carlos de la Cruz Reyna are from government press releases and from a newspaper
report in La Jornada on August 30, 2007. Details on all other captured leaders rely solely on government
press releases.
16Such data was previously only available to the research community at the state level.
17Although Coscia and Rios (2012) report areas of operation for years prior to 2004, they note that this
information is less reliable.
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drug-trafficking organization in Mexico” at the beginning of the war on drugs (Stewart and
Posey 2009).
2.4 Empirical Strategy
While we begin our analysis of the effects of the kingpin captures homicides with a
series of graphical comparisons, our main results are based on a generalized difference-
in-differences approach that allows the effects of captures to depend on (1) the association
between the municipality and the capture and (2) the amount of time that has elapsed since
the capture. Specifically, we estimate a model that considers the effects of captures on four
types of municipalities: municipalities where the capture takes place, neighboring munici-
palities where the captured kingpin’s DTO had a presence, non-neighboring municipalities
where the captured kingpin’s DTO had a presence, and neighboring municipalities where
the captured kingpin’s DTO did not have a presence. To consider the degree to which the
short, medium, and long-run effects may differ, we allow these effects to vary from 0-5
months after a capture, 6-11 months after a capture, and 12+ months after a capture. More
formally, the regression model is:
lnHmt =
4∑
type=1
(Tr05typemt δ
type
05 + Tr611
type
mt δ
type
611 + Tr12
type
mt δ
type
12 ) + αm + γt +Xmtβ + umt (2.1)
where lnHmt is the natural log of the homicide rate in municipality m at time t; the
indicator variables and parameters in the sum capture the four different types of treatment
and their effects over time; αm are municipality fixed effects; γt are month-by-year fixed
effects;Xmt can include time-varying municipality controls; and umt is an error term.18 As
18We add one to the homicide count to avoid missing values. We acknowledge that a count data model,
such as the fixed effects Poisson model, would be a natural alternative that would not require this ad hoc
approach to avoiding missing values. However, we have not been able to get such models to converge due to
the size of our data set. Another alternative would be to consider the homicide rate as the outcome instead of
the log of the homicide rate. This approach, however, would impose the assumption that treatment effects on
the homicide rate is the same magnitude for municipalities with high and low pre-treatment homicide rates
and can thus lead to negative predicted levels. In contrast, focusing on the log of the homicide rate imposes
the more natural assumption that treatment effects are proportional to pre-treatment homicide rates.
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such, the estimated effects (δ) are identified by comparing changes in violence over time
among municipalities that have been “treated” (according to our definition) to the changes
observed over time in other municipalities, where the latter are comprised of municipalities
that are not linked to any DTO and those that are only linked to DTOs that have yet to have
had a captured kingpin.
This approach allows us to avoid biases that would otherwise be introduced by fixed
differences across municipalities and by the effects of any shocks or interventions that
are common across municipalities. The fact that we have municipalities associated with
different DTOs who have kingpins captured at different times and we also have munici-
palities without any DTO presence allows us to additionally control for the effects of the
war on drugs that are common to municipalities with a DTO presence, which we accom-
plish by including indicator variables for 0–5, 6–11, and 12+ months after the beginning
of the war interacted with an indicator for the presence of a DTO in the municipality. We
can also control for additional spatial heterogeneity by including state-by-year-by-month
fixed effects in the model. In doing so, our estimates are based on comparing changes in
outcomes observed over time in municipalities affected by kingpin captures to the changes
observed in other municipalities in the same state.
As described in the previous section, our analysis of “kingpin” captures focuses on
DTO leaders and lieutenants, i.e., those at the very top level of the organization and those
who control a state or region. We further restrict attention to the first capture of a kingpin
for each DTO during the war on drugs. We do so out of concern for the endogeneity that
would be introduced when the capture of a kingpin affects homicides while also increasing
the probability of the capture of subsequent kingpins. By focusing instead on the effects
of an initial capture, our estimates will reflect the effect of an exogenous kingpin capture
inclusive of any effects that are driven by subsequent captures.
We note that standard-error estimation is not straightforward in this context. While
16
we are evaluating a panel of municipalities, there may be reason to cluster standard-error
estimates at some higher level(s) because different municipalities may have correlated
shocks to outcomes not captured by our model. In some sense, because the source of
variation is at the DTO level, it may be preferable to allow the errors to be correlated across
municipalities when they share the presence of the same DTO. However, with only five
DTOs, this would lead to problems associated with too few clusters. As a compromise,
we instead cluster on DTO-combinations, which leverages the fact that there are some
municipalities where two, three or four DTOs have a presence.19 We additionally cluster
on states to allow for some spatial correlation in the errors that might occur naturally
or through policies implemented at the state level, following the approach to multi-way
clustering described in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011).20
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Graphical Evidence of the Effects of Kingpin Captures
Before presenting the results of the econometric analysis described above, in this sec-
tion we present graphical evidence. To begin, Figure A.4 plots the homicide rate over
time separately for municipalities with a DTO presence before the war on drugs and those
that did not have such a presence. This figure shows that municipalities with a DTO
presence had higher—but not much higher—homicide rates than municipalities without
a DTO presence in the six years leading up to the war on drugs. Moreover, they tracked
one another quite closely. Perhaps most importantly, they even tracked one another after
the beginning of the war on drugs—both dipping immediately before returning to close
to their earlier levels—which provides support for using municipalities without a DTO
presence as a meaningful comparison group for the purpose of attempting to separate the
192,084 municipalities have no DTO presence, 208 have one, 89 have two, 55 have three, and only 18
have four.
20This approach leads to somewhat more conservative standard-error estimates than clustering only on
states, only on DTO combinations, or only on municipalities.
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effects of kingpin captures from the effects of other aspects of the war on drugs. Twelve
months after the beginning of the war on drugs, however, the two series began to diverge
from one another in a dramatic way. While the capture of Alfredo Beltrán Leyva, leader of
the Beltrán Leyva Cartel, would appear to be the most salient event to happen around this
time that would disproportionately affect municipalities with a DTO presence, we cannot
rule out other explanations such as a lagged effect of earlier aspects of the war on drugs.
One explanation that we can rule out is that the war on drugs did not begin in earnest until
this time—several major operations took place in 2007 which lead to the seizure of 48,042
Kg of cocaine, 2,213,427 Kg of marijuana, and 317 Kg of heroin, significantly more than
the amounts seized in the subsequent years.21
Across the four panels of Figure A.5, we present graphs that more closely correspond
to our regression analysis, which exploits variation in the timing with which kingpins
from different DTOs were first captured and separately considers municipalities of cap-
ture, neighboring municipalities where the captured kingpin’s DTO had a presence, non-
neighboring municipalities where the captured kingpin’s DTO had a presence, and neigh-
boring municipalities where the captured kingpin’s DTO did not have a presence. In partic-
ular, each panel shows the average difference between homicide rates in the municipalities
of interest and the other municipalities in their states that have no DTO presence and do
not neighbor a municipality of capture.
Before discussing the effects implied by these graphs, we note that each demonstrates
a constant difference in the homicide rates of the municipalities of interest and their com-
parison municipalities prior to a capture, providing support for the common trends as-
sumption underlying the difference-in-differences approach. Moreover, because all of the
captures considered took place at least one year after the war on drugs was initiated, this
suggests that the initial activities related to the drug war had similar effects on the munic-
21Third Calderón’s Government Report (Tercer Informe de Gobierno, 2009).
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ipalities of interest and their comparison municipalities, lending support to the idea that
the difference-in-differences approach can identify the effects of kingpin captures in the
broader context of the war on drugs.
In terms of the differences from comparison municipalities following captures, Panel
A shows an immediate spike in the homicide rates in municipalities where the captures
occurred. This difference appears to come back down 6–12 months after the capture—
though not close to the pre-capture difference—before diverging again in a manner that
suggests large long-run effects. Panel B focuses on the municipalities that neighbor these
municipalities of capture where a captured kingpin’s DTO also had a presence. For these
municipalities, we see little evidence that homicide rates change (relative to comparison
municipalities) following a capture. Panel C focuses on more distant (non-neighboring)
municipalities where a captured kingpin’s DTO had a presence. This panel indicates that
such counties experience a steady increase in homicide rates (relative to comparison mu-
nicipalities) following the kingpin capture. Panel D, which focuses on municipalities that
do not have a DTO presence but which neighbor a municipality where a capture occurred,
suggests a modest decline in homicide rates following a capture.
As a whole, the evidence shown in figures A.4 and A.5 supports the notion that kingpin
captures escalate violence, particularly in the municipalities of capture and non-neighboring
municipalities where a captured leader’s DTO has a presence. It is less clear whether cap-
tures have effects on the other municipalities of interest, which we consider further in the
regression-based analysis below.
2.5.2 Regression-based Evidence of the Effects of Kingpin Captures
Columns 1 through 3 of Table A.2 present our main results, based on the generalized
difference-in-differences model represented by Equation 2.1. In particular, these columns
show the estimated effects of a kingpin capture over time for the municipalities where
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a capture occurred, neighboring municipalities where the captured kingpin’s DTO had a
presence, non-neighboring municipalities where the captured kingpin’s DTO had a pres-
ence, and neighboring municipalities where the captured kingpin’s DTO did not have a
presence. The estimates are based on models that control for municipality fixed effects and
month-by-year fixed effects. Column 2 additionally controls for state-by-year-by-month
fixed effects to address concerns that captures may be correlated with other state-level pol-
icy initiatives and/or shocks while Column 3 further adds controls for the effects of the war
on drugs that are common to municipalities with a DTO presence by including variables
for 0–5, 6–11, and 12+ months after the beginning of the war interacted with an indica-
tor for the presence of a DTO in the municipality. Across these three columns, we note
that the estimates are somewhat sensitive to the inclusion of state-by-year-by-month fixed
effects and that the estimates are nearly identical but less precise when we additionally
control for the effects of the war on drugs that are common to municipalities with a DTO
presence.
Regardless of the exact specification, the estimates indicate significant effects of king-
pin captures and considerable heterogeneity. In particular, the estimates reflect an immedi-
ate and sustained effect on the homicide rate in a municipality of capture of approximately
60%.22 Due to relatively large standard error estimates, we can neither reject no effect
or reject large effects on homicide rates in municipalities where the captured kingpin’s
DTO had a presence that neighbored the municipality of capture. The estimated effects
on non-neighboring municipalities where the captured kingpin’s DTO had a presence in-
dicate little-to-no effect in the short run and a significant effect 12+ months following
capture that implies that captures increase homicides 13% for these municipalities. The
estimated effects are routinely negative for municipalities neighboring the municipality of
22As the outcome is the log of the homicide rate, the percent effects are calculated by exponentiating the
coefficient estimate—in this case 0.476—and subtracting one.
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a capture where the captured kingpin’s DTO does not have a presence, suggesting that
kingpin captures lead to a spatial displacement of violence.
Columns 4 and 5 of Table A.2 assess the validity of the research design by consider-
ing whether homicide rates deviate from their expected levels (based on their pre-capture
levels and the changes observed in comparison municipalities in the same state) prior to
a kingpin capture in any of these types of municipalities. These estimates are routinely
close to zero and are never statistically significant, which provides support for a causal
interpretation of the estimates discussed above.
2.5.3 Further Analyses Supporting a Causal Interpretation of the Main Results
In the same spirit as our analysis verifying that there are no “effects” before a kingpin
capture occurs, which would otherwise suggest that our regression model is picking up
something other than the effects of kingpin captures, in Table A.3 we separately consider
the estimated effects on male homicide rates, female homicide rates, rates of domestic vi-
olence, and infant mortality using our preferred model. Whereas gender-specific homicide
rates and infant mortality rates are constructed using the data described in Section 2.3,
rates of domestic violence are constructed using administrative records of individuals ar-
rested for the crime of domestic violence from Estads´ticas Judiciales en Material Penal de
INEGI. Because these data are only available beginning in 2003, our analysis of domestic
violence spans 2003–2010 in contrast to all of our other analyses which span 2001–2010.23
The estimates in Table A.3 provide further support for a causal interpretation of our
main results as they indicate: (i) the effects on overall homicides are largely driven by
male homicides, which is consistent with gender differences in participation in the drug
trade; (ii) there are no significant effects on domestic violence, which provides reassuring
evidence that the main results are not driven by idiosyncratic shocks to levels of violence
23There are also fewer observations used in the analysis of infant mortality than in other analyses, because
the outcome is undefined for cells in which the relevant population is zero.
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coinciding with captures; and (iii) there are no systematic effects on infant mortality to
suggest that the main results are driven by compositional changes towards a higher-risk
population in the affected municipalities.24
Table A.4 presents evidence along similar lines, considering effects on homicide rates
for males of different age groups.25 These estimates indicate that the effects on males
are driven by those between the ages of 15 and 44, mirroring participation rates in drug
trafficking (Fairlie 2002; Vilalta and Martínez 2012). Moreover, the estimated effects on
homicides rates for younger and older males tend to be close to zero and not statistically
significant at conventional levels.
Though our main results are able to control for national and state-level policies and
shocks common across areas in addition to those common to municipalities with a DTO
presence through the inclusion of fixed effects, a potential concern with the empirical
strategy is that it might conflate the effects of kingpin captures with the effects of military
operations more broadly. We were able to speak to this issue above by showing that the
municipalities of interest and their comparison municipalities tracked one another before
the first captures took place, even after the war on drugs began. In order to further speak
to this issue, Figure A.6 considers each of the eight major state (or multi-state) operations
of the war on drugs in the timeframe spanned by our data.26 In particular, each panel
restricts attention to the state(s) of the operation and separately plots the homicide rate for
municipalities with and without a DTO presence. Collectively, these eight panels indicate
that the major operations of the drug war did not precipitate increases in homicides in
24Interestingly, the estimates do indicate significantly elevated rates of infant mortality following a capture
in municipalities that neighbor a municipality of capture and have the same DTO presence. That said, these
estimated effects on infant mortality do not line up with the estimated effects on homicides, which are not
statistically significant and are neither routinely negative nor positive.
25The observations are not constant across columns as the outcome is undefined for cells in which the
relevant population is zero.
26The beginning dates for these operations are based on information from the fifth Calderón’s Government
Report (Quinto Informe de Gobierno, 2011).
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municipalities with a DTO presence relative to those without a DTO presence.
Figure A.7 also focuses on homicide rates as they relate to major operations of the war
on drugs but instead considers the four major operations that focused on a single munici-
pality or a small number of municipalities: the Marlin-Culiacán-Navolato Operation, the
Laguna Segura Operation, the Tijuana Operation, and the Juárez Operation. This figure
shows that all municipalities that were the target of an operation saw dramatic rises in their
homicide rates at some point in time. More relevant to the validity of our identification
strategy, there appears to be no consistent link between operations of the war on drugs and
these rises—some of these municipalities saw their homicide rates begin to rise before an
operation, some after, and some at around the same time. Instead, the spikes shown in
panels (a) and (c) correspond to the capture of leaders which occurred in the municipality;
the growth in the homicide rate in Laguna Segura is more gradual. While the rise in the
homicide rate in the municipality of Juárez preceded the Juárez Operation, we note that
our identification strategy does not rely on the conditional exogeneity of the timing of ma-
jor operations but instead relies on the conditional exogenity of the timing of the captures
considered. Moreover, the municipality of Juárez would have been affected by the Sierra
Madre-Chihuahua Operation and the capture of the Juárez DTO lieutenant Pedro Sánchez
Arras, both of which preceded the Juárez Operation.
As a whole, our analysis of state- and municipality-level operations suggests that mil-
itary operations do not themselves lead to discernible changes in homicide rates. This
is consistent with our earlier consideration of homicide rates in the months between the
beginning of the war on drugs and the months in which kingpin captures took place, pro-
viding further support for a causal interpretation of our main results.
Table A.5 offers an additional check on the main results by considering the sensitivity
of the estimates to the exclusion of any given DTO. In particular, across the columns of the
table we report results systematically excluding from the analysis municipalities where the
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Sinaloa-Beltrán-Leyva cartels have a presence (Column 2), where the Tijuana Cartel has a
presence (Column 3), where the Gulf Cartel has a presence (Column 4), where the Juárez
Cartel has a presence (Column 5), and where the Familia Cartel has a presence (Column
6), respectively. This analysis is motivated by the notion that we should be less confident
in the results if they are driven by municipalities associated with any one particular DTO.
The estimates are most sensitive to the exclusion of municipalities where the Gulf DTO has
a presence, which is perhaps not surprising in light of the fact that the the Gulf DTO spans
the most municipalities and the municipalities with the largest populations (as shown in
Table A.1). That said, the estimated effects are actually larger when these municipalities
are excluded from the analysis and thus the estimates guide us to the same conclusion
regardless of whether any one DTO is excluded from the analysis—kingpin captures lead
to large and immediate increases in the homicide rates for municipalities where captures
occur and this effect is quite persistent; there are spillover effects onto non-neighboring
municipalities where the captured kingpin’s DTO has a presence in the long run; and there
appear to be effects in the opposite direction for neighboring municipalities where the
kingpin’s DTO does not have a presence.
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In the preceding sections, we have estimated the effects of the first kingpin captures
during Mexico’s war on drugs for the DTOs that were in operation prior to the war. Newly
available data on DTOs’ areas of operation at the municipality level over time and monthly
data on homicides allow us to control for a rich set of fixed effects and to leverage variation
in the timing of kingpin captures to consider the effects on homicides in the area of capture
itself in addition to other areas where the kingpin’s DTO has a presence. The results of this
analysis indicate that kingpin captures have large and sustained effects on the homicide rate
in the municipality of capture and smaller but significant effects on other municipalities
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where the kingpin’s DTO has a presence, supporting the notion that the kingpin strategy
can have destabilizing effects throughout an organization while highlighting that this does
not imply a reduction in violence. That being said, kingpin captures do appear to reduce
homicides for municipalities neighboring a municipality of capture where the captured
kingpin’s DTO does not have a presence.
These estimates offer a new lens through which we can view the dramatic increase in
violence in Mexico since the beginning of the war on drugs. In particular, our estimates
suggest that the kingpin captures we consider led to an additional 4,934 homicides between
2007 and 2010, or approximately 7.2 percent of the homicides over that period of time.
Roughly 30 percent of these additional homicides are due to spillover effects onto non-
neighboring municipalities where a captured kingpin’s DTO has a presence. In total, the
effects of the kingpin captures we consider can explain 31.8 percent of the increase in
homicides between 2006 and 2010.27 An important caveat to these figures is that we use an
imperfect measure of DTOs’ areas of operation (based on the MOGO approach described
above) and that misclassification would serve to bias our estimates towards zero—as such,
they may be best thought of as estimates of the lower bound of the true effects.
While our estimates indicate that Mexico’s use of the kingpin strategy caused sig-
nificant increases in homicides, it is important to note that its war on drugs had several
objectives beyond reducing violence, including the establishing the rule of law, that need
to be considered in evaluating the policy. Moreover, it remains possible that the kingpin
strategy could reduce violence in the long-run in ways that have yet to be seen.
27These numbers were calculated using the regression coefficients corresponding to Column 3 of Table
A.2. In particular, they are calculated by comparing the predicted number of homicides based on the regres-
sion model under the true values of all regressors and the predicted number of homicides with all treatment
variables set to zero. These calculations indicate that the capture of kingpins caused an increase in homicides
of 49 in 2007, 891 in 2008, 1,864 in 2009 and 2,130 in 2010.
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3. THE SHORT AND LONG RUN EFFECTS OF FULL-TIME SCHOOLS ON
ACADEMIC PERFORMANCE
3.1 Introduction
In many developing countries the demand for schooling so overextends the available
resources that schools offer their services in two or three shifts throughout the day. As
capacity catches up with need, policy-makers can redirect their focus to the quality of ed-
ucation that students receive. Some countries have tried to do so by affecting different
inputs of the education production function, such as teachers’ quality, schools’ resources,
class sizes, and instructional time. As countries continue to consider making these sorts
of investments, it is important to understand their costs and benefits, in addition to under-
standing which sectors of the population could benefit the most from these policies. To
this end, this paper studies the effect of extending the school day on student achievement
in Mexico, where more than 23,000 schools extended their school day by three and a half
hours between 2007 and 2015.
Policies extending the school day have become more and more popular during the last
two decades.1 The motivation behind these policies is that more time in the classroom
should translate into better learning outcomes. However, there is an ongoing debate in the
education literature over whether lengthening the school day in fact improves academic
performance. On the one hand, those who expect large positive effects argue that longer
school days provide students with more time for learning, a deeper coverage of the aca-
demic curricula, and more time for any given task. On the other hand, those expecting
small or even negative effects argue that students tend to waste time, decrease effort, get
exhausted, and have less time for informal learning and other recreational activities (Patall
1For example, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Uruguay ex-
tended their school day between 1996 and 2011 (Holland et al., 2015).
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et. al., 2010). Given the sound logic underlying both types of arguments, this is a clear area
in which empirical evidence is necessary in order to document the sign and the magnitude
of the effects of the policy in question.
To offer evidence on the effect of longer school days on student academic performance,
I take advantage of a natural experiment and a rich dataset on student performance and
school characteristics. In particular, I analyze a natural experiment in Mexico where more
than 23,000 schools2 have extended their school day from 4.5 hours (half-time schools)
to 8 hours (full-time schools) since 2007. My empirical strategy exploits variation in
the timing with which each school extended its school day to estimate the impact of this
intervention on students’ reading and math test scores. I use a rich dataset on student
achievement at the student-level as well as schools’ and teachers’ characteristics that al-
lows me (i) to identify the short- and long-run effects of extending the school day on
students’ test scores; (ii) to provide evidence that absent the extension of the school day,
test scores of students in full-time schools and half-time schools follow the same trends;
(iii) to identify heterogeneous effects across subjects, across grade levels, and across dif-
ferent types of communities; (iv) to estimate the effect of the intervention on school-level
enrollment, gender composition of the classes, class sizes, and some measures of teacher
quality, addressing the potential of students and teachers systematically sorting themselves
into full-time schools based on their observed and unobserved characteristics; and (v) to
provide lower and upper bounds for the estimates in light of the effects on enrollment by
making extreme assumptions about changes in composition induced by the intervention.
The existing literature on extended school day programs in developing countries sug-
gests that extending the school day has improved academic performance in countries like
Uruguay (Cerdan-Infantes and Vermeersch, 2007), Chile (Bellei, 2009), and Colombia
(Hincapie, 2013). Using difference-in-differences and propensity score matching method-
2This number roughly represents a 26 percent of all primary schools in Mexico.
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ologies, they estimate effects on student achievement that range between 0 and 12.6 per-
cent of a standard deviation. However, these studies suffer from some limitations that this
paper is able to avoid. First, due to the fact that they have little or no pre-intervention
data, these studies are not able to provide much evidence in favor of the common trends
assumption needed for their difference-in-differences estimates to be valid. Second, these
studies evaluate shorter-run effects on student achievement.3 Finally, these studies focus
on the effects for older children or for students in high-poverty areas. Therefore, a more
comprehensive understanding of the effects over time, on younger children and on chil-
dren from different types of backgrounds, is important for thinking about where these sorts
of policies should be targeted in the future.4
More closely related with this study, Cabrera-Hernandez (2015) also considers the ef-
fects of extending the school day on academic performance in Mexico. He uses difference-
in-differences and propensity score matching methodologies that compare school-average
math and reading test scores before and after the intervention. Whereas he uses aggre-
gated school-level data, I use student-level data. Moreover, I estimate positive effects
on enrollment and evaluate the degree to which this might bias the estimated effects on
achievement. Another important difference is that I consider heterogeneous effects of the
intervention for students of different grade levels, allowing me to differentiate the effects
for younger versus older children and to consider the degree to which the extension the
school day has more beneficial effects over time.5
The main results indicate that extending the school day does not affect test scores
3For example, Bellei (2009) estimates the effects of a 2-year exposure to extended school days on tenth
graders’ math and reading test scores.
4Heckman (2008) shows that the rate of return to investment in human capital is the highest for early
childhood interventions and for programs targeted at disadvantaged children who are less likely to receive
parental investments to compensate for shortcomings of the public schools.
5In related work, Agüero and Beleche (2013) study the effect of extending the school year in Mexico.
They find that a 10-day increase in the length of the school year increases academic performance between 4
and 7 percent of a standard deviation.
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the year of adoption; however, it increases students’ math and reading test scores by 4.9
percent and 4.1 percent of a standard deviation, respectively, a year following adoption.
These effects grow to 14.7 percent in math and 15.6 percent in reading four years after the
adoption of the program, highlighting the fact that educational interventions that have no
immediate effects may have very large effects in later years. In addition, I show that the
first year of implementation seems to be crucial for schools and teachers to learn how to
utilize the additional time more efficiently. Moreover, the estimated effects are greater for
students in schools located in high poverty communities and for students in lower grade
levels.
In an effort to show that the main results are not driven by changes in other factors
of the education production function or changes in the composition of students,6 I esti-
mate the effects of extending the school day on enrollment, the gender composition of
the classes, class sizes, the number of teachers, and measures of teachers’ quality. These
results indicate that the intervention does not affect the gender composition of classes, the
number of teachers, or teachers’ quality. However, I find positive and significant effects
on class sizes and enrollment.
The increase in class size is generally found to negatively affect academic performance
(Krueger, 1999; and Urquiola, 2006), so the estimated effects of extending the school day
more than offset any negative effects of increased class sizes.
The enrollment effects suggest that it is possible that the composition of students at
schools changes after the intervention. That is, full-time schools might be more attractive
to high (low) ability students. To account for these possibilities, I use a modified version of
Lee’s (2009) trimming procedure for constructing bounds. I provide two sets of lower and
6For example, researchers have shown that improving teachers quality (e.g., Rockoff, 2004; Rivkin et al.,
2005; Santibañez, 2006; and Chetty et al. 2014), increasing the proportion of female students (e.g., Hoxby,
2000; and Lavy and Schlosser, 2011), attending single-gender classes (Lee et al., 2014; and Eisenkopf et al.
2015), and reducing class sizes (e.g., Krueger, 1999; Angrist and Lavy, 1999; Hoxby, 2000; and Urquiola,
2006) increased academic performance in both developed and developing countries.
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upper bounds for the treatment effects by making extreme assumptions about the change
in composition of students. These results indicate that even if it is the highest performers
who switch schools, the estimated effects are positive and statistically significant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides institutional back-
ground on the Full-Time Schools program in Mexico; Section 3.3 describes the data;
Section 3.4 describes the identification strategy and the bounding procedure; Section 3.5
presents graphical and empirical results; and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Full-Time Schools Program in Mexico
The FTS program, which began in 2007 extended the school day in public schools of
basic education.7 The goal of the program is to improve children’s rights to equitable and
inclusive, quality education. In doing so, full-time schools promote a deeper learning of
the academic curricula, including English as a second language, and the use of technology
as a learning tool, as well as practical information on healthy living, regular physical
activity, and appreciation for art and culture.
Schools that participate in the program increase their school day from 4.5 to 8 hours
during the same 200 days as other public schools, and increase their instructional time
from 800 to 1200 hours per academic year.8 Since 2007, more than 23,000 schools have
adopted the FTS program, reaching 3,463,041 students.
The federal government disperses FTS funds to the states and the Federal District
(Mexico City). These funds are used to supplement teachers’ and principals’ wages for
the extended schedule, to arrange and equip school areas, and to support the provision of
food in schools (DOF, 2012). Although the FTS program targets all public schools of basic
education, preference in funding is given to those schools that operate in only one shift, do
7Basic education in Mexico includes preschool (P1-P3), elementary school (1st-6th grades), and junior
high school (7th-9th grades).
8These increases in instructional time are as follow: from 240 to 320 in Spanish, from 200 to 280 in
math, and from 360 to 600 in other subjects for 3rd to 6th grade students.
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not share the building with another institution, have a teacher per class, are located in urban
areas, and have poor educational outcomes.9 The states’ authorities decide which schools
will participate in the program based on the aforementioned schools’ characteristics and
their budget constraint, although the selection process is not clearly defined.10
Table A.6 shows the annual federal budget for the program for each academic year
along with the number of participant schools and the number of students enrolled in
participating schools.11 In the first academic year, 500 schools received the funds and
expanded their school day. By the 2014-2015 academic year, the program had reached
23,182 schools. Figure A.8 displays the staggered implementation of the program across
Mexico. Note that by the 2012-2013 academic year all states in Mexico have full-time
schools.
3.3 Data
The two datasets used in this study come from the Ministry of Education (SEP) in
Mexico and the National Population Council (CONAPO). The primary dataset contains
information at the student level that covers the 2007-2008 to 2012-2013 academic years.
This dataset includes all public-school students’ math and reading test scores, and grade
level. Test scores are based on annual student level math and reading test scores from
the National Assessment of Academic Achievement in Schools (ENLACE). ENLACE is
a standardized test from the National Education System that is conducted in all public
and private schools of basic education in Mexico.12 The test covers math, reading, and a
third subject that rotates over time.13 It is composed of approximately 50 multiple-choice
9Every academic year, the Ministry of Education discloses the targeted schools for that year in the pro-
gram’s operating rules.
10I will discuss, in Section 3.4, how this fact might be a threat to the validity of the main results.
11These amounts are in addition to the budget previously allocated for the operation of schools in the
states.
12In elementary school, ENLACE is administered to students in grades three to six.
13Science in 2008, Civic and Ethical Formation in 2009, History in 2010, Geography in 2011, Science in
2012, and Civic and Ethical Formation in 2013.
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questions for each subject, and the scores range from 200 to 800.14 The main advantage of
ENLACE test scores is that they are intended to be comparable across students and over
time, and the test is administered by people unrelated to the class.15 The test is conducted
during eight sessions of 45 minutes each over two days. For this reason, some students do
not answer both reading and math section or do not respond to all the questions for one of
the subjects. Additionally, after the tests are conducted, they are verified in an automatized
system to check whether the results are reliable.16 I drop from the main analysis test scores
of students that did not answer at least half of the questions in a given subject or students
with test scores classified as unreliable by the automatized system.17
In addition to test scores, the ENLACE dataset also provides information on the loca-
tion of each school. I use this information to match each school to the poverty index of the
locality18 where the school is located. This allows me to consider heterogeneous effects of
the impact of the FTS program on test scores for students living in high- and low- poverty
areas.19 The poverty index is estimated by CONAPO as a measure of social exclusion, and
it is composed of localities’ deficiencies in terms of education, housing, population, and
households’ income. To avoid concerns about endogeneity, I use the poverty index of the
14I normalize test scores across the entire sample for each exam (grade level, subject, and year) to have
mean zero and variance one.
15Although ENLACE test scores are available since 2005/06, I only include in my sample test scores from
2007/08 to 2012/13 because, as shown in Figures A.10 and A.11, there are inconsistencies in the distribution
of test scores for the first two years of application. However, including those years in the analysis does not
affect the main results.
16The automatized system uses the K-index and Scrutiny methods, which are based on similar incorrect
response patterns, to detect answer copying. In case of detecting any irregularity, it is recorded in the
individual reports for the student.
17In Table A.12, I show evidence that the fraction of students with such test scores is not affected by the
FTS program.
18A locality is a generic territorial division for a population center with its own identity. It can be small
in size and population (village) or large and highly populated (city). The union of several localities form
a municipality. The National Institute of Statistics and Geography keeps control of the list of localities in
Mexico.
19Students living in high- and low- poverty areas are defined as those living in a locality above and bellow
the median poverty index.
32
localities in 2005, which is prior to the introduction of the FTS program.20
The treatment variable is an indicator of the year in which each of the schools adopted
the FTS program. The information on if and when each school adopted the program comes
from the Ministry of Education. The schools that were incorporated to the program in
2007/08 are dropped from the main analysis because they already had an extended school
day, making a before-and-after comparison impossible.
The secondary dataset contains information at the school level on schools’ and classes’
characteristics; it is based on school-level census data from Estadísticas 911 collected by
the Ministry of education at the beginning of every academic year. This dataset contains
information on total enrollment, enrollment by grade, gender composition of the classes,
average class sizes, number of teachers, and the fraction of teachers with some graduate
education for each academic year.
3.4 Identification Strategy
3.4.1 Estimation Method
To identify the effect of longer school days on student achievement, I exploit variation
in the timing with which schools adopted the program between the 2008-2009 and 2012-
2013 academic years. The main results are based on a difference-in-differences research
design. Formally, I estimate the effects of extending the school day using the following
regression model:
TSisgt =
4∑
k=0
δkFTSst−k + αs + γt +Xsgtβ + uisgt (3.1)
where TSisgt is the math or reading test score of student i in school s, grade g, year t;
FTSst−k is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for full-time schools k years
20In particular, it is possible that the poverty index will decrease in localities with a larger share of students
enrolled in full-time schools.
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after they adopt the program and zero otherwise; γt are year fixed effects; Xsgt includes
time varying school-grade controls; and uistg is an error term. The coefficient of interest
is δk, which measures the average treatment effect of the FTS program k years after its
implementation.
The identifying assumption is that in the absence of the FTS program, students in
adopting schools would have experienced changes in achievement similar to those in non-
adopting schools. I address the validity of this assumption in two ways. First, I look for
graphical evidence to see whether test scores of students in half-time and full-time schools’
do not diverge prior to treatment. Second, I test this assumption formally by including
indicators from one year and two years prior to treatment in Equation 3.1; if the estimated
coefficients for the leading indicators are close to zero and statistically insignificant, it
provides support for the validity of the identifying assumption.
Although treatment is at the school level, there might be shocks not captured by this
model that are correlated across students, such as unobserved state-level education policies
or expenditures, or tests with different levels of difficulty each academic year. In order to
account for potential within state and within grade-by-year correlation of the errors, I
estimate robust standard errors that are two-way clustered at the state and grade-by-year
level using the procedure described in Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller (2011).
3.4.2 Bounding Estimates
One potential threat to my ability to identify the causal effect of extending the school
day on academic performance is that parents might be motivated to switch their children
from half-time to full-time schools. If such decisions are independent of students’ abilities,
there would not be a concern; however, if it is high (low) performing students who sys-
tematically switch from half-time to full-time schools, the estimated coefficients would be
biased upwards (downwards). Ideally, if I were able to follow students over time, I could
34
control for their unobserved characteristics by including individual fixed effects. However,
given that the data do not include unique student identifiers, this is not feasible.
In order to asses the sample selection problem that occurs when treatment affects sam-
ple attrition, Lee (2009) proposes an intuitive trimming procedure that bounds the average
treatment effects by making extreme assumptions about missing observations. Lee identi-
fies the excess number of individuals who are likely to select into treatment, and then he
trims the upper and lower tails of the outcome distribution by this number of individuals.
That is, he obtains the worst-case and best-case scenarios for the estimated effects. In
the spirit of Lee (2009), I construct bounds based on the opposing assumptions that the
students that switch from half-time to full-time schools are either the highest or the lowest
performing students. However, since I observe the universe of test scores, I do not trim the
tails as Lee suggests. Instead, I reassign the students at the extreme end of the full-time
schools’ test score distribution to a half-time school. Statistically, reassigning the highest
performing full-time students from full-time schools to half-time schools represents the
extreme assumption that the highest performing students systematically select into full-
time schools. Imagining that full-time schools’ highest performing students had instead
remained in half-time schools and reestimating the coefficients yields a lower bound of
the effects of full-time schools. Conversely, the extreme assumption that the lowest per-
forming students systematically select into full-time schools yields an upper bound to the
effect of the extended school day.
The validity of this approach relies on a monotonicity assumption (i.e. the flow of stu-
dents is only in one direction, from half-time to full-time schools). This assumption seems
plausible in this context for three reasons. First, 76 percent of full-time schools’ princi-
pals saw increases in school applications. Second, 93 percent of parents with children in
full-time schools are satisfied with the schools that their children attend. Finally, 91 per-
cent of parents with children in full-time schools perceive that the FTS program improves
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children’s education outcomes (CONEVAL, 2013).
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Main Results
In this section, I examine whether the FTS program improves students’ academic per-
formance. Figure A.9 panels (a) and (b) show the average difference in math and reading
test scores, respectively, between students in full-time schools and students in half-time
schools from 2007-2008 to 2012-2013. These panels indicate that extending the school
day increases student-average math and reading test scores. Moreover, test scores of stu-
dents in full-time and half-time schools have a similar trajectory prior to the implementa-
tion of the program; this suggests that math and reading test scores of students in full-time
schools would not have increased relative to those in half-time schools in the absence of
the program.
Table A.7 panels A and B show the regression-based estimates for math and reading
test scores, respectively. Column 1 shows the estimated effects based on the difference-in-
differences model described by Equation 3.1. Estimates in Column 2 additionally control
for grade-specific unobserved characteristics that are constant over time. In Column 3,
I also control for possible heterogeneity in the different ENLACE tests for each grade
and year by including grade-by-year fixed effects. In Column 4, I additionally control for
school-by-grade fixed effects. In Column 5, I present the preferred specification which
additionally controls for other programs in which the schools participate that might affect
students’ performance, these include the Quality Schools Program and the Secure School
Program.21 Finally, in columns 6 and 7, I perform a formal statistical test to check whether
21The purpose of the Quality Schools Program is to decentralize the decision making process, to improve
infrastructure, and to provide school supplies in public schools of basic education (see Skoufias and Shapiro,
2006 for a deeper discussion of the program). The purpose of the Secure Schools Program is to provide
schools with technical and financial supports to prevent addiction, delinquency and violence in schools of
basic education (SEP, 2007).
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test scores of students in schools that adopted the program diverge from the scores of stu-
dents in schools that did not adopt the program prior to the adoption. I do so by including
indicator variables for one year and two years prior to the adoption of the FTS program
using the preferred specification.
Estimates in Panel A indicate that extending the school day has no significant effect on
students’ math test scores the year of adoption. However, it increases math performance by
5 percent of a standard deviation a year after the adoption, 7.7 percent two years after, 12.4
percent three years after, and 14.7 percent four years after.22 Additionally, the estimated
coefficients for one year and two years prior to treatment, in columns 6 and 7, are close to
zero and not statistically significant. This provides evidence in favor of the validity of the
identifying assumption.
The estimates in Panel B indicate a similar pattern of effects on reading scores. Longer
school days do not affect students’ reading test scores the year of adoption; however, it
increases reading performance by 4.1 percent of a standard deviation one year after the
adoption, 6.8 percent two years after, 11.6 percent three years after, and 15.6 percent four
years after.23 In addition, the estimated coefficients for the indicators of one year and two
years prior to treatment, in columns 6 and 7, are not statistically significant. This suggests
that reading test score trends did not diverge from expectations before the introduction of
the program.
Even though both graphical- and regression- based evidence suggest that extending
the school day is effective in increasing students’ academic performance, it is important
to note that these apparent effects could be driven by (i) changes in the composition of
students at schools, or (ii) changes in other factors of the education production function
after schools adopt the program. Regarding the composition of students, we might be
22Note that the inclusion of grade and grade-by-year fixed effects do not affect the estimates; I do not
expect them to change because I normalize test scores for each test (i.e. subject, grade, and year).
23This effect represents more than two thirds of a year of schooling (Carlsson et al., 2015).
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concerned that longer school days might signal a better quality of education, so motivated
parents might switch their children to schools with longer school days. Also, parents might
prefer to keep their troublesome children busy at school but not their well-behaved ones, or
they might prefer to keep their boys for longer time at school but not their girls. Regarding
other factors of the education production function, full-time schools might attract more
(less) qualified teachers, or they might attract more teachers and, therefore, have smaller
classes. In any of these scenarios, the estimated effects might be driven by these changes
rather than by the extension of the school day.
In consideration of these issues, Table A.8 shows the estimated effects of the FTS
program on enrollment, the fraction of students who are male, class sizes, the number of
teachers, and the fraction of teachers with some graduate education. While the FTS pro-
gram has no significant effects on the gender composition, the number of teachers, or on
the fraction of teachers with some graduate education, it does increase both enrollment and
class size. Specifically, the estimates in Column 1 indicate that extending the school day
increases student enrollment by 4.9 percent the year of adoption, and the estimated effect
grows to 7.9 percent four years after adopting the program. Additionally, Column 3 shows
that the FTS program causes an increase of approximately one student per class. Con-
sidering that increasing class sizes reduces academic performance in both developed and
developing countries (Krueger, 1999; and Urquiola, 2006), the change in class size is al-
most certainly not exaggerating the positive effect of extending the school day. Therefore,
I concentrate my efforts on understanding how students switching schools might affect the
main results.
3.5.2 Bounded Treatment Effects
The estimated effects of the FTS Program on enrollment suggest that it is possible
that the composition of students at schools changes after the intervention. To address the
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potential bias that could possible be caused by students switching schools, I consider two
approaches to constructing bounds using the procedure described in Section 3.4.
To begin, I consider the two extreme scenarios of the switching behavior to construct
lower and upper bounds. First, I consider the scenario in which it is the highest performing
students who are switching schools. Intuitively, this extreme scenario can be addressed by
reassigning the highest performers in full-time schools to half-time schools. That is, I
reassign treatment status to the top 2.3 percent of the students’ math/reading test scores
distribution for each test in the treated schools the year of adoption, the top 3 percent a
year after, the top 3.3 percent two years after, the top 3.5 percent three years after, and the
top 3.8 percent four years after.24 I then reestimate the coefficients, obtaining the lower
bounds. Second, I consider the scenario in which it is the lowest performing students who
are switching schools. I do so by reassigning the lowest performers in full-time schools
to half-time schools. That is, I reassign treatment status to the bottom 2.3 percent of the
math/reading student-grade-school-year test scores distribution for the treated schools the
year of adoption, the bottom 3 percent a year after, the bottom 3.3 percent two years after,
the bottom 3.5 percent three years after, and the bottom 3.8 percent four years after. I then
reestimate the coefficients to obtain the upper bounds for the effect of the FTS program on
student achievement.
My second bounding approach is motivated by the fact that the effect on enrollment
is immediate and the effect on student performance does not appear until a year after
adoption. This evidence suggests that the initial enrollment effect (4.9 percent) does not
increase test scores for schools changing to full-time schedules. To account for this possi-
bility, I construct a second set of lower and upper bounds by reassigning treatment status to
24These numbers are calculated using the regression coefficients corresponding to Column 1 of Table A.8
and Equation A.3. For example, the year of adoption, 2.3%=
(
1 − 1
1+ 12 (0.049)
)
100%. See Appendix A.2.1
for further details on these calculations.
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the remaining proportion of students switching schools.25 This is, I reassign treatment to
the top/bottom 0.6 percent of the math and reading student-grade-school-year test scores
distribution for the treated schools a year after adoption, the 1 percent two years after, the
1.1 percent three years after, and the 1.4 percent four years after.26 I then reestimate the
coefficients obtaining lower and upper bounds.
Table A.9 shows the estimates based on my preferred regression specification and its
lower and upper bounds using the two bounding procedures described above. Column 1
shows unbounded estimates, columns 2 and 3 show the set of lower and upper bounds for
the first bounding approach, and columns 4 and 5 show the set of lower and upper bounds
for the second approach.
The bounds based on the first approach, in columns 2 and 3, indicate treatment effects
on math test scores between 0 and 5.1 percent of a standard deviation the year of adoption,
and between 5.8 and 23.4 four years after adoption. The estimated effects for reading test
scores (Panel B) follow the same pattern and are similar in magnitude.
The results of the second procedure are reported in columns 4 and 5, and the estimated
lower and upper bounds for the treatment effects are much tighter. I find that there is
no significant effect on math performance the year of treatment, but the effects grow to
between 14.4 and 14.9 percent four years after adoption. The estimated effects for reading
test scores (Panel B) follow the same pattern and are similar in magnitude.
Given that the lower and upper bounds are similar in magnitude using my preferred
bounding approach, in the last section I focus only on unbounded estimates.
25Students who switch schools after the first year of the implementation of the FTS program.
26These numbers are calculated using the regression coefficients corresponding to Column 1 of Table A.8
and Equation A.7. For example, the year after adoption, 0.6%=
(
1− 1+ 12 (0.049)
1+ 12 (0.062)
)
100%. See Appendix A.2.1
for further details on these calculations.
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3.5.3 Treatment Effect Heterogeneity
Given resource constraints, policy-makers have to consider how to efficiently allocate
their budget by identifying which types of schools and students should be targeted. For
this purpose, in this section, I explore the degree to which there are heterogeneous effects
on test scores by grade and by the poverty level of the area where the schools are located.
3.5.3.1 Grade Level Heterogeneity
Table A.10 panels A and B separately consider the estimated effects on math and read-
ing test scores for each grade using my preferred specification.27 While these estimates
hold important insights, some care is required in interpreting the estimates across the var-
ious rows and columns, which correspond to the estimated effects across time and across
grades. In particular, the estimates need to be interpreted in light of the fact that (i) the
effects of the program may grow over time as schools learn how to make use of the addi-
tional class time, and that (ii) the effects are likely to be stronger for students/grades who
have had an opportunity for full-day schooling for a larger share of their schooling. In
discussing the estimates reported in the table, I highlight the degree to which each of these
factors is relevant.
Column 1 Panel A presents the estimated effects on math test scores for students in
third grade. These results indicate that extending the school day does not have an effect
on third graders’ academic performance the year of adoption. However, it increases test
scores by 4.9 percent of a standard deviation a year after adoption, and this effect grows to
8.7 percent two years after adoption.
In order to consider the degree to which schools become more effective at utilizing the
additional class time over time, we can compare the estimated effects of newer full-time
27Particularly, I estimate the effects for students in grades third to sixth, which are the students for which
ENLACE test scores are available.
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schools (unbolded) with the estimated effects of full-time schools that have gain more ex-
perience over time (bolded). The bolded estimates indicate that the FTS program increases
third graders’ math test scores by approximately 14 percent of a standard deviation for stu-
dents that have been enrolled in full-time schools for three years while the schools have
been part of the program for four or five years. These results suggest that the first year of
implementation is crucial for teachers and students to learn how to utilize the additional
time more efficiently.
Similarly, Column 2 Panel A presents the estimated effects on fourth graders’ math test
scores. These estimates provide additional support for the notion that schools get better at
using the extra class-time over time. The estimates in columns 3 and 4 show the estimated
effects for fifth and sixth graders, respectively. For all grades, test score gains increase with
each additional year in the FTS program, but the gains are consistently higher for younger
students. In math, the gains for third graders reached 8.7 percent of a standard deviation
two years after adoption, compared to 5.3 percent for sixth graders.The estimates in Panel
B indicate a similar pattern for reading test scores.
3.5.3.2 Poverty Level Heterogeneity
Children from high poverty areas might be exposed to multiple factors that affect aca-
demic performance such as poor health and nutrition, or parents’ absenteeism that could be
alleviated by keeping and feeding them at school. Panels A and B of Table A.11 separately
consider the effects on student performance for students in schools located in low and high
poverty localities. In particular, columns 1 and 2 show the effects for students below and
above the median poverty index of the locality where the school is located, which I refer
to as low and high poverty levels. Schools in high poverty localities make statistically sig-
nificant gains in test scores one year after the adoption of the FTS program, whereas test
scores gains in low poverty schools do not become statistically significant until three years
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after adoption. For both high and low poverty schools, test score gains increase with each
additional year in the FTS program, but the gains are consistently higher for high poverty
schools. In math, the gains for high poverty schools reached 15.2 percent of a standard
deviation four years after adoption, compared to 9.7 percent in low poverty schools. Sim-
ilarly, in reading, the four-year gains in high and low poverty schools are 16.4 percent and
10.8 percent, respectively. Because test scores tend to be higher in low poverty schools,
the greater gains in high poverty schools would seem to reduce the academic gap between
the poorer students and the more affluent students.
In summary, the estimated effects of the extended school day differ by students’ age
and the poverty status of their locality. The effects are stronger for those students in lower
grade levels and for students in schools located in high poverty communities.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I study the causal effects of extending the school day on students’ aca-
demic performance by analyzing a large-scale education program in Mexico—the Full-
Time Schools Program—in which participant schools increased the length of their school
day from 4.5 to 8 hours. I take advantage of the staggered rollout of the program and a
novel dataset to disentangle the causal effects of extending the school day from the effects
of other possible confounding factors. Because the program has an effect on enrollment,
I use an intuitive bounding procedure that allows me to address the potential for selection
bias caused by non-random switching into full-time schools. The results indicate that ex-
tending the school day increases both reading and math test scores. In addition, the long
follow-up period allows me to demonstrate that the effects increase considerably over time.
Moreover, the estimated effects are more pronounced in schools located in high poverty
localities and for students in lower grade levels. This evidence suggests that as developing
countries expand their capacity to deliver education, extending the school day can be an
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effective way to improve the quality of education they offer and it can be effective to close
the education gap between the rich and the poor. A broader implication of my results is
that early assessments of educational interventions may be poor predictors of longer run
effects.
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4. THE EFFECT OF CHILDREN’S TIME IN SCHOOL ON MOTHERS’ LABOR
SUPPLY: EVIDENCE FROM MEXICO’S FULL-TIME SCHOOLS PROGRAM
4.1 Introduction
Despite the growth in female labor force participation (LFP) in recent decades, female
participation rates have remained lower than their male counterpart. Moreover, this gap is
especially large in the developing world, where traditional gender roles assign women the
primary responsibility of childrearing. As a result, women’s labor supply in developing
countries heavily depends on their fertility decisions, and specifically, on how much they
are time- and budget- constrained due to childrearing and the alternative costs of childcare
institutions. Thus, the availability and affordability of childcare centers are important for
women to increase their labor market participation while their children are still growing
up.1
Studies of the US have proposed that the absence of family-friendly policies, including
parental leave and part-time work entitlements, explains 28-29 percent of the decrease
in female labor force participation in the US, relative to other OECD countries, over the
period from 1990 to 2010 (Blau and Kahn, 2013). Different governments around the globe
have responded to the low female participation rates in the labor market with a variety of
policies such as tax reliefs, child benefits, paid leaves and childcare subsidies. As different
countries continue to consider these types of policies, it remains important to understand
their costs and benefits. To this end, this paper studies the effect of an implicitly large
childcare subsidy, through longer school-days in primary education, on mothers’ labor
supply at the extensive and intensive margins.
When the public provision of regulated childcare institutions is low or absent, moth-
1For a discussion of such influences on female labor participation in the context of the countries in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), see Jaumotte (2003).
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ers’ chances to participate in the labor market may decrease depending on the supply and
quality of the available alternatives for childcare. The option to take care of their children
may range from a costly private institution with an uncertain quality to non-professional
options, such as family members, close friends, and untrained babysitters (Bernal and
Keane, 2011; Schady et al., 2015). In such contexts, Full-Time School (FTS) programs
work as a childcare alternative provided by trained caregivers (i.e. teachers) in a con-
trolled environment. Consequently, FTS programs have the potential to positively affect
children’s outcomes along with mothers’ labor force participation (LFP).2
To provide evidence on the effects of extending the school-day in primary education
on mothers’ labor supply, we take advantage of a natural experiment in Mexico where the
government implemented a FTS program that extended the school-day from four and a
half to eight hours in primary schools (1st-6th grades) all over the country between 2007
and 2014. Our empirical strategy exploits within-individual variation in exposure to full-
time schools— defined as the share of predicted FTS seats in a municipality—to estimate
the effects on female labor supply at the extensive and intensive margins.
We use ten years of data collected in the National Employment and Occupation Survey
in Mexico (ENOE, for its abbreviation in Spanish). ENOE is a rotating panel of house-
holds that contains information on mothers’ labor force participation, number of weekly
hours worked, earnings, and sociodemographic characteristics that allow us to identify the
cumulative effects of longer school days on mothers’ labor supply, to identify heteroge-
neous effects by education level and by poverty level of the locality of residence, and to
provide evidence that the effects are not driven by changes in the propensity to participate
in the labor force in municipalities with full-time schools.
2Researchers have documented positive effects of FTS programs on children’s outcomes in the short-
and the long-run. For example, full-time schools improve children’s academic performance (Bellei, 2009;
Cabrera-Hernandez, 2015; Padilla-Romo, 2015), reduce high school dropout rates (Pires and Urzua, 2010),
and reduce the probability of teenage pregnancy (Kruger and Berthelon, 2009).
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The existing literature has focused on evaluating the impact of childcare institutions for
preschool age children (3 to 5 years old) in developed countries, showing some positive
effects on mothers’ labor supply.3 However, the differences between richer and poorer
countries in labor institutions and trends in female labor supply reduce the scope of such
evidence to guide policies in developing countries where, additionally, mothers’ low LFP
is commonly attributed to cultural factors besides economic conditions.
Evidence for developing countries is scarce but shows a higher likelihood of mothers’
employment after increases in childcare supply. Berlinski and Galiani (2007) estimate the
effects of an 18 percent increase in preschool availability between 1994 and 2000 in Ar-
gentina and find that the likelihood of maternal employment increased between 6 and 16
percentage points depending on the model specification. Similarly, in the case of Mexico,
Ángeles et al. (2011) use a time discontinuity in children’s eligibility to “Estancias Infan-
tiles,” a public childcare program for 265,415 preschool-age children (0-4 years old) all
over the country and find an increase of 18 percent in mothers’ probability of employment
and an average effect of six more hours worked per week.
Few studies have focused on children aged 6 years and older who are still in need
of parents’ care. Even less so in developing countries.4 This is an important omission
because many children in developing countries are in school for only a few hours a day
(4-5 hours), which means they spend more time at home, potentially reducing mothers’
availability for paid work. In this regard, Contreras et al. (2010) offer evidence of the
3General results of free preschools on female LFP in the US and Canada show no impact for single
mothers with younger children and positive effects on married mothers, both at the intensive and extensive
margins (Gelbach, 2002; Baker et al., 2008). Similarly, smaller but significant effects were found for child-
care subsidies on mothers’ labor supply in countries such as Belgium, France and the Netherlands, while
no effects were found for Norway (Dujardin et al., 2015; Givord and Marbot, 2015; Bettendorf et al., 2015;
Havnes and Mogstad, 2011)
4For example, Nemitz (2015) studies the effects of a sharp increase of more than 30 percentage points in
full-time schools in Germany and finds effects close to zero. Similarly Felfe et al. (2013) find a positive effect
on mothers’ full-time employment, but a negative effect on fathers’ employment at the intensive margin in
Switzerland.
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effects of a FTS Program that lengthened the school day by two hours in Chilean high
schools. The authors estimate an average gain on mothers’ labor force participation of 11
percentage points (equivalent to 17 percent of the baseline), despite the relatively small
increase in the time of instruction and that high school pupils are older (13 to 17 years
old). Furthermore, Berthelon et al. (2015) offer evidence of a more permanent effect on
female participation, as the probability of staying more than six months in the Chilean
labor market increased by 19 percentage points. To the best of our knowledge, evidence
on the Chilean FTS Program is the only analysis of the relation between “childcare” for
older children and female LFP in a developing country.
By focusing on the Mexican context, we are able to contribute to the existing knowl-
edge on the relationship between childcare for older children and mothers’ labor supply in
developing countries. Moreover, evaluating the effects of a major policy change on labor
supply is important for a more comprehensive understanding of how welfare in a broader
sense may be improved by these sorts of policies. FTS policies have the potential not
only to improve children’s welfare and school outcomes, but also mother’s LFP and the
available income at home, improving overall welfare, especially, for the most vulnerable
sectors of the population.
Our main results indicate that longer school-days increase mothers’ labor supply at
the extensive and intensive margins, increasing mothers’ labor force participation by 7
percentage points and the number of worked hours per week by 2.4. Moreover, these
increases in labor supply are accompanied by a 47 percent average increase in earnings
across the population of mothers as a whole, and a 63 percent increase in earnings in high
poverty areas. The greater gains in high poverty communities would seem to reduce the
income gap between the rich and the poor. Overall, these results suggest that previous to
the introduction of the FTS program, female LFP was certainly constrained by the absence
of family friendly policies, particularly childcare institutions.
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 offers information on Mexico’s
childcare policies, female labor force participation and the Full-Time Schools Program.
Section 4.3 presents the details of the data used for the main analysis as well as some
descriptive statistics. Section 4.4 explains the main methodology to identify the effects
of longer school days on mothers’ labor supply. Section 4.5 presents the main results.
Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Background
4.2.1 Female Labor Force Participation and Childcare in Mexico
In recent decades, female participation rates in Mexico have substantially increased.
Diverse factors have pushed women into the labor force, including demographic and cul-
tural shifts, the opening of the Mexican economy, a rise in the levels of formal education,
the implementation of structural reforms and a series of economic crises (Orraca et al.,
2016).
According to information from Mexico’s population censuses, the percentage of women
between 18 and 65 years of age participating in the labor force grew from 19.4% in 1970,
to 24.2% in 1990 and to 42.3% in 2010. However, Mexican female LFP remains as one
of the lowest among Latin-American countries with similar per-capita income. In 2015,
only 44% of Mexican women participated in the labor market; this is comparable to a sim-
ilar proportion in Chile but it is lower than the 53% registered in Argentina and Uruguay
and the 59% observed in Brazil. Furthermore, considering the female to male LFP ratio,
Mexico stands next to the lowest in the whole continent with women’s labor force partici-
pation standing at only 55% that of men, above only Honduras (49%) and below the Latin
American average of 66% (Martínez Gómez et al., 2013).
This low women’s participation in the labor market potentially relates to the absence
of family oriented programs (Staab and Gerhard, 2010). Although some childcare policies
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have been applied in Mexico before, such as the Federal Daycare Program for Working
Mothers which subsidizes community- and home-based daycare to facilitate employment
of low-income mothers,5 the country’s spending on family benefits including childcare has
not changed dramatically in the last decade and it is barely above 1% of the GDP. This is
the worst average of the 33 countries in the OECD, including mid-income countries such
as Israel (2.4%) and Chile (1.4%).6
Finally, Mexico’s enrollment rates in preschool (children 3 to 5 years old) are rela-
tively high (91%) and above the OECD average of 81%. Primary school (for ages 6 to
12) is practically universal. However, all preschools and primary schools, before FTS im-
plementation, were part-time, having daily schedules of four to five hours. This plausibly
discouraged mothers’ full-time participation in the labor market, especially for the 88%
of mothers who have no access to full-time childcare services at any given age. The FTS
program therefore offers an important potential for the analysis of changes in labor supply
in a context of low public investment and low female participation.
4.2.2 The Full-Time Schools Program
The FTS program started in 2007. Its aim was to improve learning opportunities in
primary education by extending the school day from four-and-a-half to eight hours. The
program started in 500 schools and by the 2014-2015 academic year it had reached 23,182
schools all over Mexico. This number represents approximately 25 percent of all ele-
mentary schools in Mexico. Notably, from its inception, the FTS program identified two
secondary objectives of the program: to help single mothers to participate in the labor
market and to support mono-parental families (SEP, 2010, p.3). In total, the FTS program
represented a public spending of approximately US$460 millions from 2007 to 2013.7
5For a thorough review of this program see (Staab and Gerhard, 2010).
6Data on family policies and school participation and childcare presented in this section are extracted
from the OECD Family database downloaded in February 2016.
7For further details of the FTS program see (Cabrera-Hernandez, 2015) and (Padilla-Romo, 2015).
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Schools selected into the program generally have certain characteristics. The most
relevant to this study are: (i) schools have minimum infrastructure requirements (e.g. space
for the construction of a kitchen and computer classrooms, sports infrastructure, and basic
services such as water and electricity), (ii) schools are working in one shift either in the
morning or afternoon but not both (in Mexico, approximately 40% of primary schools
offer two shifts), and (iii) preferentially, schools should have been located in vulnerable
areas. Nonetheless, these guidelines were only a suggestion provided by the Ministry of
Education, not binding requirements, and, in the end, the states were the ones in charge of
choosing the schools to be treated. We will discuss in Section 4.4 how this fact might bias
our estimates.
4.3 Data
Our analysis uses survey and administrative data from the National Institute of Statis-
tics and Geography (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía, INEGI), the Min-
istry of Education, and the National Population Council (Consejo Nacional de Población,
CONAPO) that together brings a quarterly individual-level dataset covering the period
from the first quarter of 2005 (2005:Q1) to the third quarter of 2015 (2015:Q3). Our
primary outcome variables are labor force participation, number of weekly hours worked,
and monthly earnings of females with elementary school-age children, while our treatment
variable is the share of predicted FTS seats in a municipality at a given quarter.8
The labor outcomes used in our analysis are based on the National Survey of Occupa-
tion and Employment (Encuesta Nacional de Ocupación y Empleo, ENOE) from INEGI.
ENOE is a rotating panel of households, in which each household remains in the survey
8To avoid concerns about endogeneity, we define the predicted number of seats in full-time schools as the
average school enrollment before the FTS program began (2001-2006). Ideally, if we were able to observe
schools’ capacity, our treatment variable would be the share of FTS seats at a given year. However, we
only observe school enrollment which, particularly in full-time schools, may be correlated with mothers’
propensity to participate in the labor market.
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for five consecutive quarters. That is, we observe whether household members change la-
bor force participation status, number of weekly hours worked, or monthly earnings over
five consecutive periods.9 In addition, ENOE contains information on sociodemographic
characteristics of the individuals, as well as the location of the household. These allow us
to control for time-varying individual characteristics, and to match each individual with
the share of FTS seats in the municipality every quarter. We also use the location infor-
mation to match each mother to the poverty index of her locality of residence.10 This
allows us to consider heterogeneous effects of the extension of the school day on mothers’
labor supply that reside in high- and low- poverty areas. The poverty index is estimated
by CONAPO as a measure of social exclusion in the locality using information from the
Census of Population and Housing on education, housing characteristics, population, and
income.11 To avoid concerns about endogeneity, we use the poverty index of the localities
in 2005, which is two years prior to the extension of the school day.
The treatment variable is constructed using annual school-level census data on enroll-
ment and participation in the FTS program from the Ministry of Education. Information on
enrollment is based on Estadísticas 911 from the Ministry of Education. To transform this
information from academic years to quarters, we take the last and the first three quarters
of the year. For example, the fraction of seats in full-time schools during the 2007-2008
academic year affects labor outcomes on 2007:Q4, 2008:Q1, 2008:Q2, and 2008:Q3.
Our main analysis focuses on mothers who are the household’s head and on wives
9In ENOE, labor force participation is defined as people over 15 years old that had a job or were looking
for one during the week the survey was conducted, the number of weekly hours worked is defined as the
average number of hours worked by an individual in the week of the survey, and the monthly earnings is
defined as the income that the employed population received for the job they held in the week of the survey.
10The term locality in Mexico refers to the smallest of the three levels of division (locality, municipality,
and state) of the national geostatistical framework. It is a generic territorial division for a population center
with its own identity. It can be small in size and population (country, or village) or large and highly populated
(city). INEGI keeps control of the list of localities in Mexico.
11Mothers living in high- and low- poverty areas are defined as those living in a locality with poverty
index above and below the sample median.
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or partners over 15 years old whose children are studying elementary education, because
for this group we can unambiguously match mothers to their children. Moreover, it is
plausible to think that mothers are the group of females who are more affected by the
policy.12
4.4 Identification Strategy
We estimate the effects of extending the school day on female labor outcomes using a
difference-in-differences research design that uses within-individual variation in access to
full-time schools, which is defined as the share of predicted FTS seats in a municipality.
The logic behind this approach is that mothers living in municipalities with a high share of
predicted FTS seats are in a position to benefit from the extended school day, increasing
their labor supply, while females in municipalities with a low share are not. Therefore, we
compare changes in labor outcomes of females with school-age children in municipalities
with full-time schools to the change observed in municipalities not affected by the policy
extending the school day.
Because the fraction of predicted FTS seats changes only once within the range of the
data for each individual, we use only the variation from the first and fifth periods with a
long-difference regression model. This specification allows us to estimate the longer-run
effects of extending the school day. Our main results are based on the following model,
∆4Yimt = ∆4FTSmtδ + γt + ∆4Ximtβ + ∆4uimt (4.1)
where Yimt denotes either an indicator variable reflecting whether individual i in mu-
nicipality m participated in the labor force at quarter t, the number of weekly hours
worked, or the log of monthly earnings of individual i in municipality m at quarter t;
FTSmt is the fraction of predicted FTS seats in municipality m at quarter t; Ximt in-
12Note that, by using this approach we cannot identify the effect for females with elementary school age
children that live in extended households.
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clude time-varying individual controls including years of schooling, age, and age of the
youngest child; γt are year-by-quarter fixed effects; uimt is an error term; and ∆4 denotes
the 4-period difference operator (e.g., ∆4FTSmt = FTSmt − FTSmt−4). This long-
difference regression equation allows us to control for individual specific observed and
unobserved characteristics that are constant over time, as well as, nationwide time-varying
shocks to mothers’ labor outcomes common to all municipalities. The coefficient of in-
terest (δ) can be interpreted as the cumulative effect of the FTS program on the change in
labor outcomes over the 5-quarter period that each individual is observed, instead of the
average effect, as in fixed effects models.
Additionally, in some specifications we control for state-by-year-by-quarter fixed ef-
fects where we identify δ by comparing changes in labor outcomes in municipalities with
a high fraction of predicted FTS seats to the change observed in the remaining munici-
palities in the same state. Robust standard errors are clustered at the municipality-level to
account for potential error correlations within municipalities.
The identifying assumption underlying our research design is that in the absence of the
extension of the school day, changes in mothers’ labor supply in municipalities with a high
fraction of predicted FTS seats would have been similar to those in municipalities with a
lower fraction. Even though we cannot prove that this assumption holds, we can argue that
it is plausible in our setting. First, we are able to provide graphical evidence that mothers’
labor outcomes in treatment and control municipalities do not diverge prior to the adoption
of the FTS program. Second, we formally test for divergence by including lead terms of
the change in fraction of predicted FTS seats a year and two years prior to treatment to
Equation 4.1. Finally, we provide evidence showing that the time-varying factors that
affect female labor outcomes are orthogonal to the within-municipality variation in the
fraction of predicted FTS seats. In this case δ would provide the causal effects of extending
the school day on female labor supply.
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Another concern about the validity of the estimated effects is that females with school
age children could select into or out of the municipality in quarters that increased the
fraction of predicted FTS seats. For example if females with school-age children that are
more likely to participate in the labor force move to municipalities with full-time schools,
we would overestimate the effects of extending the school day. We address this potential
selection bias problem by estimating the degree to which the change in the fraction of
predicted FTS seats affects the probability of mothers staying in their municipality of
residence during the first and fifth survey quarters.
4.5 Results
We begin our analysis by providing graphical evidence on the effects of extending the
school day and on the identifying assumption underlying our research design. Figure A.12
panels (a) to (c) respectively show the state-by-year-by-quarter adjusted average mothers’
LFP, number of weekly hours worked, and log of monthly earnings over time for munic-
ipalities with a fraction of predicted FTS seats that is in the top quartile (high-intensity
of treatment) relative to those in the bottom quartile (low-intensity of treatment). While
it is not easy to appreciate the size of the effects, the three panels show an increase on
LFP, number of weekly hours worked, and monthly earnings for females with elementary-
school-age-children in municipalities with a high-intensity of treatment (relative to munic-
ipalities with low-intensity of treatment). Furthermore, mothers’ LFP, number of weekly
hours worked and monthly earnings for municipalities with a high and low intensity of
treatment have similar trends prior to the introduction of the FTS program, providing
support in favor of the identifying assumption needed for the difference-in-differences es-
timates to be valid.
Table A.13 shows the estimated effects of extending the school day on female labor
outcomes based on the long-difference model represented by Equation 4.1. Panel A shows
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the estimated effects on mothers’ LFP, Panel B the number of weekly hours worked, and
Panel C the log of monthly earnings. Particularly, estimates in Column 1 show the baseline
model represented by Equation 4.1. In Column 2, we additionally control for state-by-
year-by-quarter fixed effects. In Column 3, we include time-varying individual controls.
Finally, in columns 4 and 5, we test for divergence prior to treatment by including the
4-period difference in fraction of predicted FTS seats one year and two years prior to
treatment.
The long-difference estimates show the cumulative effects of going from none to all
schools being full-time, which results in increases of mothers’ LFP of 7 percentage points,
number of weekly hours worked of 2.4, and monthly earnings of 47 percent. In addition,
the coefficients for one year and two years prior to treatment are not significant and small
in magnitude, providing support for our identification strategy.
It is important to note that mothers were linked to the fraction of predicted FTS seats
based on their municipality of residence. Given this approach, non-random sample attri-
tion could be a threat to identification if most of the mothers leaving the sample lived in
municipalities that increase (decrease) the intensity of treatment.13 In consideration of this
potential attrition problem, we examine whether the change in the fraction of predicted
FTS seats in a given quarter affects the likelihood that the mother will be in the sample
during the first and last periods.
Table A.14 shows the estimated effects of the share of predicted FTS seats on an in-
dicator variable of whether or not the mother is in the sample during the first and fifth
interviews. In Column 1, we present the baseline model represented by Equation 4.1; in
Column 2, we additionally control for state-by-year-by-quarter fixed effects. The long-
differences estimates indicate that changes in the share of predicted seats in full-time
13Cano-Urbina (2016) highlights the attrition problem in the ENOE for the period 2005–2012; he finds
that 84.19 percent of the individuals who started the sample are still in it during the fifth interview.
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schools do not affect the probability of leaving the sample in the fifth interview. These
results suggest that attrition is independent of changes in exposure to full-time schools.
4.5.1 Treatment Heterogeneity
We now explore the extent to which there are heterogeneous effects of extending the
school day on mothers’ labor supply. In particular, we consider heterogeneous effects by
education, and by poverty level of the locality of residence, using our preferred identifica-
tion strategy.
4.5.1.1 Education
Motivated by the fact that education strengthens the connection of mothers to the labor
force by increasing their potential earnings, or by reducing the range for specialization
within the household (Eckstein and Lifshitz, 2011), in columns 2 and 3 of Table A.15,
we report separate estimates for mothers with levels of education below (0-9 years) and
above (10 or more years) the sample median.14 The estimates in columns 2 and 3 indicate
that the effects of extending the school day are concentrated among low educated mothers,
who are less attached to the labor market.15 Specifically, these results indicate that going
from none to all schools being full-time increases LFP by 7.8 percentage points, number of
weekly hours worked by 2.5 hours, and monthly earnings by 48 percent for low educated
mothers. We find no evidence of significant effects on labor outcomes for highly educated
mothers.
4.5.1.2 Poverty Level
Now we estimate the effects of extending the school day on labor supply separately
for mothers with residence in localities with poverty levels below (low poverty) and above
14Nine years of schooling translates into completed junior high school, which is also the sample median
and the compulsory level of education in Mexico.
15In our sample, LFP for mothers with education levels between zero and nine years is 42.4 percent,
compared to 63.7 percent for mothers with ten or more years of schooling.
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(high poverty) the sample median. This analysis is motivated by the fact that preference in
FTS funding was given to schools located in vulnerable areas. Therefore, we expect our
long-difference estimated effects to be mostly driven by mothers with residence in high
poverty localities, as they are more likely to live closer to full-time schools.
Table A.16 shows the estimated effects by poverty level of the locality of residence.
The estimated coefficients indicate that increases in labor supply are mostly driven by
mothers residing in high poverty communities, increasing LFP by 8.6 percentage points,
weekly hours worked by 3.27, and monthly earnings by 63 percent in high poverty areas.
We find no effects on mothers residing in low poverty localities. These results support the
notion that mothers living in vulnerable areas are the most likely to be affected. More-
over, the greater gains in high poverty communities would seem to reduce the income gap
between the rich and the poor.
4.5.2 Robustness Checks
In an effort to show that the main results are not driven by a simultaneous increase in
the propensity to participate in the labor force due to the labor market characteristics in
those municipalities with a higher share of predicted FTS seats, we explore the degree to
which extending the school day differently affects labor supply of women and men with
and without school age children. If we find effects on subgroups of the population that
should not be affected by the policy, our results might not be valid. It is important to note
that it is possible that labor outcomes for these groups might be affected by the extension
of the school day; however, we argue that such effects must be second-order.
Table A.17 shows the long-difference estimated effects on labor outcomes for women
and men. In particular, in Column 2 we show the effects for women without school age
children; for this group of women, we find positive but smaller effects than for women
with school age children (Column 1) on LFP, suggesting a spillover effect possibly driven
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by other family members taking care of the children after school. However, for this same
group we find no significant effects on number of weekly hours worked or on labor income.
In columns 3 and 4, we show the estimated effects for men with and without school age
children. For both groups estimates for LFP, number of weekly hours worked, and monthly
earnings are close to zero and statistically insignificant.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper examines whether the FTS program in Mexico, which substantially in-
creased the length of the school day, increased mothers’ labor supply. More broadly, it
asked whether childrearing hinders women’s participation in the labor market. We exploit
the variation in the staggered implementation of the FTS program and the intensity of
treatment across municipalities to measure the effects of the extension of the school day
on mothers’ labor supply at the intensive and extensive margins. Using survey and admin-
istrative data, we estimate long-difference models which exploit differences in mothers’
exposures to the FTS program. Our main results document positive and statistically sig-
nificant effects on mothers’ labor force participation, number or weekly hours worked,
and monthly earnings. Mothers with fewer years of schooling and mothers living in high
poverty localities showed the strongest labor market response to the availability of full
time schools for their children. This evidence suggests that longer school days can be an
effective policy to increase mothers’ labor market participation while their children are
still growing up and that the greater gains for low income mothers would seem to reduce
the income gap between the rich and the poor.
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The three essays in this dissertation have looked at the causal effects of different inter-
ventions on crime, education, and labor outcomes using quasi-experimental research de-
signs. Particularly, how these interventions affect differently the most vulnerable sectors
of the population. In Chapter 2, we find that kingpin captures have large and sustained ef-
fects on the homicide rate in the municipality of capture and smaller but significant effects
on other municipalities where the kingpin’s DTO has a presence, supporting the notion
that the kingpin strategy can have destabilizing effects throughout an organization while
highlighting that this does not imply a reduction in violence. In Chapter 3, we find that
extending the school day increases both reading and math test scores. Finally, in Chapter
4, we document that longer school days have positive and statistically significant effects on
mothers’ labor force participation, number or weekly hours worked, and monthly earnings.
All analyses use difference-in-differences research designs which allow us to disentan-
gle the causal effects of the interventions from the effects of other possible confounding
factors. The validity of the results rely on the assumptions that in the absence of the in-
terventions, changes in outcomes in the treatment and the control groups would have been
the same and that there are not other simultaneous interventions. The rich data used for the
analyses allow us to show that these assumptions seem plausible in our settings. Then the
effects that we find can be interpreted as causal and have many policy implications. First,
while our estimates indicate that Mexico’s use of the kingpin strategy caused significant
increases in homicides, it is important to note that its war on drugs had several objectives
beyond reducing violence, including the establishing the rule of law, that need to be con-
sidered in evaluating the policy. Second, as developing countries expand their capacity to
deliver education, extending the school day can be an effective way to improve the quality
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of education they offer and it can be effective to close the education gap between the rich
and the poor; a broader implication of these results is that early assessments of educational
interventions may be poor predictors of longer run effects. Finally, longer school days can
be an effective policy to increase mothers’ labor supply while their children are still grow-
ing up and the greater gains for low income mothers would seem to reduce the income gap
between the rich and the poor.
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APPENDIX A
FIGURES AND TABLES
A.1 Kingpin Strategy
Figure A.1: Monthly Homicide Rates Prior the Beginning of the War on Drugs
(a) Michoacán
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Notes: Panel A plots the homicide rate in the state of Michoacán, President Felipe Calderón’s home state,
leading up to his declaring war on drugs. Panel B plots the nationwide homicide rate over the same time
period. These homicide rates are calculated based on the universe of death certificates from the vital statistics
of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and population counts from the National
Council of Population (CONAPO) and El Colegio de México (COLMEX).
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Figure A.2: National Homicide Rate
Beginning of the war on drugs
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Notes: See Figure A.1. Vertical lines are drawn to highlight the beginning of the war on drugs and the first
capture of a DTO leader during the war on drugs.
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Figure A.3: Municipalities with DTO Presence, 2004-2006
(a) Any DTO (b) Sinaloa-Beltrán-Leyva DTO
(c) Tijuana DTO (d) Gulf DTO
(e) Juárez DTO (f) La Familia DTO
Notes: Each panel shows the municipalities with the specified DTO presence prior to the war on drugs. The
areas of operation for each DTO are based on Coscia and Rios (2012).
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Figure A.4: Homicide Rates for Municipalities With and Without a DTO Presence
Beginning of the war on drugs
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Notes: Municipalities with and without a DTO presence prior to the war on drugs are shown in Figure A.3.
Vertical lines are drawn to highlight the beginning of the war on drugs and the first capture of a DTO leader
during the war on drugs. Homicide rates are calculated based on the universe of death certificates from the
vital statistics of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and population counts from the
National Council of Population (CONAPO) and El Colegio de México (COLMEX).
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Figure A.5: Homicide Rates in Municipalities of Interest
Relative to Others in the Same State without a DTO Presence
(a) Municipalities of capture
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(b) Neighboring municipalities where captured
leader’s DTO has a presence
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(c) Non-neighboring municipalities where cap-
tured leader’s DTO has a presence
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(d) Neighboring municipalities where captured
leader’s DTO does not have a presence
0
2
4
6
8
Av
g.
 D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 H
om
ici
de
 R
at
es
 p
er
 1
00
,0
00
-36 -24 -12 0 12 24 36
Months from First Capture
Notes: Each panel shows the average difference over time between homicide rates in the highlighted mu-
nicipalities and the other municipalities in their states that have no DTO presence (and do not neighbor a
municipality of capture). The time scale is adjusted to address the fact that different municipalities were
affected by first captures taking place at different times—it is centered on months from such a capture. Mu-
nicipalities with and without a DTO presence prior to the war on drugs are shown in Figure A.3. Homicide
rates are calculated based on the universe of death certificates from the vital statistics of the National Insti-
tute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and population counts from the National Council of Population
(CONAPO) and El Colegio de México (COLMEX).
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Figure A.6: Homicide Rates for Areas Targeted in Major State-Level Operations
(a) Michoacán Operation
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(b) Guerrero Operation
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(c) Sierra Madre-Chihuahua Opera-
tion
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(d) San Luis Potosí Operation
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(e) Veracruz Operation
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(f) Chiapas Operation
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(g) Aguascalientes Operation
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(h) Nuevo León-Tamaulipas Opera-
tion
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Notes: Each panel shows the homicide rates in the state(s) corresponding to the operation, with separate
lines for municipalities with a DTO presence and municipalities without a DTO presence. The shaded
region begins when the operation began and ends when the operation ended (where known). The Sierra
Madre operation includes the states of Chihuahua, Durango, and Sinaloa. Where applicable, vertical lines
show the capture of a kingpin considered in our analysis. Municipalities with and without a DTO presence
prior to the war on drugs are shown in Figure A.3. Homicide rates are calculated based on the universe
of death certificates from the vital statistics of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI)
and population counts from the National Council of Population (CONAPO) and El Colegio de México
(COLMEX).
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Figure A.7: Homicide Rates for Areas Targeted in Major Municipality-Level Operations
(a) Marlin-Culiacán-Navolato Operation
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(b) Laguna Segura Operation
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(c) Tijuana Operation
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(d) Juárez Operation
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Notes: Each panel shows the homicide rates in the municipality or municipalities corresponding to the op-
eration. The shaded region begins when the operation began and ends when the operation ended (where
known). The Marlin Operation includes the municipalities of Mazatlán and Culiacán while the Laguna Se-
gura Operation includes the municipalities of Saltillo, Torreón, San Pedro de las Colinas, Lerdo, and Gómez
Palacio. Where applicable, vertical lines show the capture of a kingpin considered in our analysis. Munic-
ipalities with and without a DTO presence prior to the war on drugs are shown in Figure A.3. Homicide
rates are calculated based on the universe of death certificates from the vital statistics of the National Insti-
tute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and population counts from the National Council of Population
(CONAPO) and El Colegio de México (COLMEX).
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Table A.1: First Capture of a Kingpin For Each DTO During the War on Drugs
DTO Name Position Date
Municipalities
w/ DTO
Presence
(2004-2006)
Fraction of
Population in
These
Municipalities
Sinaloa-Beltrán-Leyva Alfredo Beltrán
Leyva Leader 1/21/08 166 0.36
Tijuana Eduardo Arellano
Félix Leader 10/25/08 47 0.18
Gulf Juan Carlos de la
Cruz Reyna Lieutenant 8/29/07 277 0.44
Juárez Pedro Sánchez
Arras Lieutenant 5/13/08 65 0.15
La Familia Alberto Espinoza
Barrón Lieutenant 12/29/08 68 0.09
Notes: Information of first captures is based on a compendium of press releases of the Army (SEDENA),
the Navy (SEMAR), and the Office of the Attorney General (PGR). Municipalities with a DTO presence
prior to the war on drugs are shown in Figure A.3. The proportion of the population is estimated based
on population counts from the National Council of Population (CONAPO) and El Colegio de México
(COLMEX).
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Table A.2: Estimated Effects of Kingpin Captures on Homicide Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Municipality of capture prior 7 to 12 months 0.012
(0.124)
Municipality of capture prior 1 to 6 months -0.044 -0.032
(0.305) (0.293)
Municipality of capture after 0 to 5 months 0.694*** 0.473** 0.476** 0.469** 0.481**
(0.248) (0.213) (0.226) (0.216) (0.230)
Municipality of capture after 6 to 11 months 0.622*** 0.394*** 0.392*** 0.386*** 0.397***
(0.138) (0.089) (0.093) (0.088) (0.098)
Municipality of capture after 12 or more months 0.816*** 0.525* 0.523* 0.516* 0.528*
(0.300) (0.288) (0.302) (0.272) (0.308)
Neighbor w/ same DTO prior 7 to 12 months 0.004
(0.108)
Neighbor w/ same DTO prior 1 to 6 months -0.025 -0.019
(0.128) (0.133)
Neighbor w/ same DTO after 0 to 5 months 0.297* 0.097 0.101 0.098 0.105
(0.178) (0.119) (0.121) (0.115) (0.134)
Neighbor w/ same DTO after 6 to 11 months 0.182* -0.062 -0.066 -0.069 -0.062
(0.103) (0.055) (0.073) (0.076) (0.085)
Neighbor w/ same DTO after 12 or more months 0.212 -0.132 -0.134 -0.138 -0.131
(0.131) (0.142) (0.124) (0.134) (0.146)
Non-neighbor w/same DTO prior 7 to 12 months 0.051
(0.040)
Non-neighbor w/same DTO prior 1 to 6 months -0.014 0.021
(0.042) (0.042)
Non-neighbor w/same DTO after 0 to 5 months 0.008 -0.002 0.008 -0.002 0.032
(0.025) (0.022) (0.024) (0.055) (0.050)
Non-neighbor w/same DTO after 6 to 11 months 0.066 0.046 0.040 0.030 0.064
(0.041) (0.031) (0.039) (0.078) (0.062)
Non-neighbor w/same DTO after 12 or more months 0.175*** 0.122*** 0.115*** 0.105 0.139**
(0.061) (0.040) (0.044) (0.083) (0.065)
Other neighbor prior 7 to 12 months 0.031
(0.021)
Other neighbor prior 1 to 6 months -0.001 0.001
(0.024) (0.025)
Other neighbor after 0 to 5 months 0.003 -0.062* -0.060** -0.060* -0.059**
(0.028) (0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.027)
Other neighbor after 6 to 11 months -0.025 -0.085** -0.085** -0.085** -0.083*
(0.028) (0.042) (0.042) (0.040) (0.044)
Other neighbor after 12 or more months -0.025 -0.098 -0.098 -0.098 -0.096
(0.035) (0.088) (0.090) (0.089) (0.087)
N 294480 294480 294480 294480 294480
State-by-year-by-month fixed effects no yes yes yes yes
Additional controls no no yes yes yes
Notes: Observations are at the municipality-month level, spanning January 2001 through December 2010.
All estimates include month-by-year fixed effects and municipality fixed effects. The additional controls
for columns 3–5 are indicator variables for 0–5, 6–11, and 12+ months after the beginning of the war for
municipalities with DTO presence. Standard-error estimates in parentheses are two-way clustered at the
state and DTO-combination levels. Homicide rates are calculated based on the universe of death certificates
from the vital statistics of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and population counts
from the National Council of Population (CONAPO) and El Colegio de México (COLMEX). Areas of DTO
operation for each DTO are based on Coscia and Rios (2012) as described in the text.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table A.3: Estimated Effects on Other Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Homicide Male Homicide Female Domestic Violence Infant Mortality
Municipality of capture after 0 to 5 months 0.460** 0.107 0.145 0.007
(0.229) (0.221) (0.368) (0.036)
Municipality of capture after 6 to 11 months 0.365*** 0.223 0.168 0.046
(0.062) (0.198) (0.192) (0.042)
Municipality of capture after 12 or more months 0.496* 0.337 0.080 -0.021
(0.290) (0.267) (0.272) (0.035)
Neighbor w/ same DTO after 0 to 5 months 0.085 -0.060 -0.050 0.071
(0.114) (0.119) (0.166) (0.044)
Neighbor w/ same DTO after 6 to 11 months -0.096 -0.094 -0.007 0.093***
(0.071) (0.102) (0.141) (0.031)
Neighbor w/ same DTO after 12 or more months -0.159 -0.092 0.004 0.066*
(0.145) (0.068) (0.092) (0.038)
Non-neighbor w/same DTO after 0 to 5 months 0.002 0.003 -0.025 -0.023
(0.024) (0.016) (0.037) (0.018)
Non-neighbor w/same DTO after 6 to 11 months 0.038 -0.001 -0.046 -0.022
(0.038) (0.022) (0.042) (0.021)
Non-neighbor w/same DTO after 12 or more months 0.103** 0.023 -0.077* 0.007
(0.043) (0.024) (0.041) (0.022)
Other neighbor after 0 to 5 months -0.047* -0.020 0.033 -0.025
(0.026) (0.039) (0.051) (0.043)
Other neighbor after 6 to 11 months -0.071 0.005 0.064 -0.056
(0.044) (0.015) (0.070) (0.046)
Other neighbor after 12 or more months -0.082 -0.012 0.041 -0.028
(0.087) (0.035) (0.038) (0.030)
N 294480 294480 235584 294357
Notes: See Table A.2. Additionally note that all models control for municipality fixed effects, state-by-year-
by-month fixed effects, and indicator variables for 0–5, 6–11, and 12+ months after the beginning of the
war for municipalities with DTO presence. Domestic violence data begin in January 2003 and are based on
administrative records of individuals arrested for the crime of domestic violence from Estads´ticas Judiciales
en Material Penal de INEGI. Infant mortality rates are calculated based on the universe of death certificates
from the vital statistics of the National Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and population counts
from the National Council of Population (CONAPO) and El Colegio de México (COLMEX).
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Table A.4: Estimated Effects on Male Homicide Rates by Age
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Age group: 0-14 15-29 30-44 45-59 60-74 75-89 90+
Municipality of capture after 0 to 5 months 0.085 0.474*** 0.436** 0.143 0.075 0.007 -0.001
(0.101) (0.165) (0.174) (0.208) (0.165) (0.077) (0.060)
Municipality of capture after 6 to 11 months 0.010 0.220 0.505*** 0.196 0.076 -0.064 -0.007
(0.052) (0.189) (0.131) (0.163) (0.057) (0.052) (0.058)
Municipality of capture after 12 or more months 0.008 0.527* 0.523*** 0.299 0.122 -0.051 0.010
(0.074) (0.276) (0.191) (0.233) (0.154) (0.044) (0.050)
Neighbor w/ same DTO after 0 to 5 months -0.006 -0.033 0.130 -0.122 -0.060 -0.017 -0.013
(0.044) (0.103) (0.082) (0.105) (0.054) (0.033) (0.022)
Neighbor w/ same DTO after 6 to 11 months -0.046 -0.007 -0.145** -0.137* -0.078 -0.009 -0.008
(0.062) (0.083) (0.060) (0.080) (0.068) (0.032) (0.022)
Neighbor w/ same DTO after 12 or more months -0.009 -0.093 -0.116 -0.126 -0.064 -0.016 0.005
(0.038) (0.139) (0.152) (0.105) (0.045) (0.027) (0.027)
Non-neighbor w/same DTO after 0 to 5 months -0.007 -0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.009 -0.006 0.009
(0.006) (0.026) (0.021) (0.025) (0.010) (0.007) (0.009)
Non-neighbor w/same DTO after 6 to 11 months -0.011 0.025 0.016 0.018 0.001 -0.007 0.011
(0.008) (0.036) (0.028) (0.032) (0.013) (0.009) (0.012)
Non-neighbor w/same DTO after 12 or more months -0.008 0.087** 0.062* 0.037 -0.010 -0.017 0.000
(0.009) (0.041) (0.034) (0.035) (0.011) (0.010) (0.014)
Other neighbor after 0 to 5 months 0.020 -0.008 -0.035 -0.006 -0.007 -0.003 -0.008
(0.013) (0.025) (0.041) (0.022) (0.013) (0.013) (0.009)
Other neighbor after 6 to 11 months 0.022 -0.015 -0.045 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.008
(0.015) (0.026) (0.036) (0.019) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011)
Other neighbor after 12 or more months 0.024 -0.042 -0.035 -0.005 -0.006 0.005 -0.002
(0.015) (0.066) (0.063) (0.025) (0.025) (0.015) (0.022)
N 294480 294480 294480 294429 294480 293938 252559
Notes: See Table A.2. Additionally note that all models control for municipality fixed effects, state-by-year-
by-month fixed effects, and indicator variables for 0–5, 6–11, and 12+ months after the beginning of the war
for municipalities with DTO presence.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
80
A.2 Full-Time Schools
Figure A.8: Full-Time Schools, 2007/08-2012/13
(a) 2007/08 (b) 2008/09
(c) 2009/10 (d) 2010/11
(e) 2011/12 (f) 2012/13
Notes: Each panel shows the geographic distribution of schools in the FTS program in a given academic
year. Schools’ location data comes from the Schools Information System (SNIE).
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Table A.5: Sensitivity Analysis for Estimated Effects of Kingpin Captures on Homicide
Rates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
DTO-controlled municipalities omitted from analysis: none
Sinaloa-
Beltrán-
Leyva
Tijuana Gulf Juárez Familia
Municipality of capture after 0 to 5 months 0.476** 0.529** 0.458* 0.888*** 0.228 0.444
(0.226) (0.240) (0.271) (0.129) (0.312) (0.292)
Municipality of capture after 6 to 11 months 0.392*** 0.419*** 0.394*** 0.573*** 0.298** 0.464***
(0.093) (0.103) (0.108) (0.130) (0.116) (0.121)
Municipality of capture after 12 or more months 0.523* 0.517 0.440 1.253*** 0.317 0.594*
(0.302) (0.318) (0.353) (0.036) (0.428) (0.352)
Neighbor w/ same DTO after 0 to 5 months 0.101 0.195** 0.084 0.261*** 0.125 0.080
(0.121) (0.081) (0.094) (0.095) (0.111) (0.130)
Neighbor w/ same DTO after 6 to 11 months -0.066 0.024 -0.080 -0.070 -0.011 -0.051
(0.073) (0.069) (0.061) (0.149) (0.082) (0.111)
Neighbor w/ same DTO after 12 or more months -0.134 -0.058 -0.199 -0.058 -0.139 -0.095
(0.125) (0.167) (0.134) (0.041) (0.181) (0.131)
Non-neighbor w/same DTO after 0 to 5 months 0.008 0.017 0.005 0.042 -0.000 0.013
(0.024) (0.025) (0.018) (0.030) (0.026) (0.033)
Non-neighbor w/same DTO after 6 to 11 months 0.040 0.047 0.022 0.086 0.018 0.073
(0.039) (0.049) (0.035) (0.056) (0.055) (0.045)
Non-neighbor w/same DTO after 12 or more months 0.115*** 0.107** 0.096** 0.149*** 0.091 0.142***
(0.044) (0.046) (0.039) (0.042) (0.063) (0.051)
Other neighbor after 0 to 5 months -0.060** -0.050*** -0.046*** -0.052** -0.038 -0.084
(0.029) (0.011) (0.013) (0.023) (0.039) (0.078)
Other neighbor after 6 to 11 months -0.085** -0.094*** -0.077** -0.117*** -0.048 -0.095
(0.042) (0.023) (0.032) (0.025) (0.051) (0.143)
Other neighbor after 12 or more months -0.098 -0.071** -0.095 -0.124* 0.010 -0.171
(0.090) (0.033) (0.077) (0.072) (0.036) (0.178)
N 294480 274560 288840 260760 285960 284880
State-by-year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: See Table A.2. Additionally note that all models control for municipality fixed effects, state-by-year-
by-month fixed effects, and indicator variables for 0–5, 6–11, and 12+ months after the beginning of the war
for municipalities with DTO presence.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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Figure A.9: Estimated Difference in Students’ Academic Performance Before and After the Adoption the Full-Time Schools
Program Between Students in Adopting and Non-Adopting Schools
(a) Math
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(b) Reading
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Notes: Each panel shows the average difference over time between test scores of students in full-time schools and students in other public schools that did
not adopt the FTS program between 2007/08 and 2012/13. The time scale is adjusted to address the fact that different schools adopt the FTS program at
different times.
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Table A.6: Annual Budget of the Full-Time Schools Program
Academic Year Additional Budget Number of Schools Avg. Additional Budget per School Number of students Avg. Additional Budget per Student
(Millions of Pesos) (Thousands of Pesos) (Pesos)
2007/08 NA 500 N/A 136,500 N/A
2008/09 N/A 953 N/A 192,830 N/A
2009/10 457.01 2,000 228.51 368,620 1,240
2010/11 448.36 2,273 197.25 439,231 1,021
2011/12 1,548.17 4,758 325.38 932,324 1,661
2012/13 2,508.72 6,708 373.99 1,368,022 1,834
2013/14 5,289.16 15,349 344.59 2,143,811 2,467
2014/15 10,382.86 23,182 447.88 3,463,041 2,998
Notes: Program’s budget is based on the evaluation report 2014-2015 (CONEVAL, 2015). The number of schools and students in full-time schools are
based on data from the Ministry of Education in Mexico. Values are expressed in constant 2012 prices.
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Table A.7: Estimated Effects of Extending School Days on Student Achievement
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: Math
2 years prior 0.010
(0.023)
1 year prior -0.001 0.002
(0.019) (0.026)
Year of adoption 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.019
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.026)
1 year after 0.049** 0.049** 0.049** 0.049** 0.050** 0.050** 0.054*
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.023) (0.027)
2 years after 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.081***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.027)
3 years after 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.123*** 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.123*** 0.128***
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025) (0.031)
4 years after 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.149*** 0.147*** 0.146*** 0.150***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.031) (0.035)
N 42035412 42035412 42035412 42024942 42024942 42024942 42024942
Grade Fixed Effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Grade by Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes yes
School by Grade Fixed Effects no no no yes yes yes yes
Other programs no no no no yes yes yes
Panel B: Reading
2 years prior 0.011
(0.020)
1 year prior 0.002 0.006
(0.013) (0.020)
Year of adoption 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.015 0.019
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.023)
1 year after 0.041** 0.041** 0.041** 0.041** 0.041** 0.042* 0.046*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.025)
2 years after 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.068*** 0.069*** 0.074***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.026)
3 years after 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.122***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.029)
4 years after 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.157*** 0.156*** 0.156*** 0.161***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.027) (0.030)
N 41873388 41873388 41873388 41862944 41862944 41862944 41862944
Grade Fixed Effects no yes yes yes yes yes yes
Grade by Year Fixed Effects no no yes yes yes yes yes
School by Grade Fixed Effects no no no yes yes yes yes
Other programs no no no no yes yes yes
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a different regression. Observations are at the student level,
spanning 2007/08 though 2012/13 academic years. All estimates include school fixed effects and year fixed
effects. The other programs for columns 5-7 are indicator variables for schools participating in the Quality
Schools program and the Secure School Program. Estimated standard errors in parentheses are two-way
clustered at the state and grade-by-year level. Student test scores from each exam are normalized to have
mean zero and standard deviation one.
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level
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Table A.8: Estimated Effects on School Composition and Other Factors of the Education
Production Function
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Enrollment Fraction of Male Class Size Number of Teachers Fraction of Teachers
w/ Graduate Education
Year of adoption 0.049*** -0.000 0.585*** 0.065 0.004
(0.007) (0.000) (0.125) (0.042) (0.003)
1 year after 0.062*** -0.000 0.684*** 0.148 0.003
(0.009) (0.001) (0.206) (0.094) (0.004)
2 years after 0.070*** -0.002 0.633* 0.272 0.006
(0.010) (0.002) (0.369) (0.205) (0.004)
3 years after 0.073*** -0.002 0.721** 0.236 0.006
(0.012) (0.003) (0.324) (0.188) (0.005)
4 years after 0.079*** -0.003 0.784** 0.259 0.005
(0.016) (0.003) (0.308) (0.186) (0.008)
N 705024 705024 705024 705024 705024
Notes: Each column represents a different regression. Observations are at the school level, spanning 2005/06
though 2012/13 academic years. All estimates include school fixed effects and year fixed effects. Estimated
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level.
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level
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Table A.9: Estimated Effects on Student Achievement: Lower and Upper Bounds
Estimates Lower Bound 1 Upper Bound 1 Lower Bound 2 Upper Bound 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Math
Year of adoption 0.016 -0.021 0.051*** 0.015 0.016
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
1 year after 0.050** -0.002 0.101*** 0.050** 0.051**
(0.020) (0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020)
2 years after 0.077*** 0.005 0.146*** 0.076*** 0.078***
(0.017) (0.019) (0.021) (0.017) (0.017)
3 years after 0.124*** 0.046* 0.201*** 0.122*** 0.125***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021)
4 years after 0.147*** 0.058* 0.234*** 0.144*** 0.149***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
N 42024942 42024942 42024942 42024942 42024942
Panel A: Reading
Year of adoption 0.014 -0.023 0.050*** 0.014 0.014
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
1 year after 0.041** -0.011 0.093*** 0.040** 0.041**
(0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017)
2 years after 0.068*** -0.005 0.138*** 0.067*** 0.069***
(0.018) (0.021) (0.022) (0.018) (0.018)
3 years after 0.116*** 0.036 0.193*** 0.114*** 0.117***
(0.019) (0.023) (0.023) (0.019) (0.019)
4 years after 0.157*** 0.065** 0.243*** 0.153*** 0.158***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.030) (0.026) (0.025)
N 41862944 41862944 41862944 41862944 41862944
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a different regression. Observations are at the student level,
spanning 2007/08 though 2012/13 academic years. All estimates include school fixed effects, year fixed
effects, grade fixed effects, grade-by-year fixed effects, school-by-grade fixed effects, and indicator variables
for schools participating in the Quality Schools Program and the Secure School Program. Estimated standard
errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the state and grade-by-year level. Student test scores from
each exam are normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level
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Table A.10: Estimated Effects on Student Achievement by Grade
(1) (2) (3) (4)
3rd grade 4th grade 5th grade 6th grade
Panel A: Math
Year of adoption 0.009 0.008 0.035** 0.010
(0.016) (0.019) (0.013) (0.014)
1 year after 0.049** 0.040 0.052** 0.060**
(0.018) (0.022) (0.014) (0.016)
2 years after 0.087** 0.081*** 0.085*** 0.053*
(0.024) (0.019) (0.010) (0.022)
3 years after 0.142*** 0.143*** 0.119*** 0.092**
(0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.025)
4 years after 0.141*** 0.214*** 0.101*** 0.132**
(0.026) (0.022) (0.018) (0.036)
N 10441478 10559490 10598414 10425560
Panel B: Reading
Year of adoption 0.014 0.015 0.028 0.000
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.013)
1 year after 0.053** 0.038* 0.038** 0.036*
(0.020) (0.019) (0.014) (0.015)
2 years after 0.089** 0.075** 0.074*** 0.033
(0.026) (0.020) (0.011) (0.022)
3 years after 0.140*** 0.127*** 0.104*** 0.093***
(0.029) (0.017) (0.019) (0.022)
4 years after 0.166*** 0.192*** 0.125*** 0.139**
(0.025) (0.018) (0.026) (0.035)
N 10393256 10535282 10591644 10342762
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a different regression. Observations are at the student level,
spanning 2007/08 though 2012/13 academic years. All estimates include school fixed effects, year fixed
effects, and indicator variables for schools participating in the Quality Schools Program and the Secure
School Program. Estimated standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the state and grade-by-
year level. Student test scores from each exam are normilized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level
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Table A.11: Estimated Effects on Student Achievement by Poverty Level of the School’s
Locality
(1) (2)
Low Poverty High Poverty
Panel A: Math
Year of adoption 0.006 0.026
(0.022) (0.022)
1 year after 0.025 0.045**
(0.029) (0.022)
2 years after 0.043 0.087***
(0.026) (0.030)
3 years after 0.068** 0.140***
(0.034) (0.032)
4 years after 0.097** 0.152***
(0.037) (0.039)
N 19531410 19618329
Grade Fixed Effects yes yes
Grade by Year Fixed Effects yes yes
School by Grade Fixed Effects yes yes
Panel B: Reading
Year of adoption 0.000 0.026
(0.017) (0.022)
1 year after 0.015 0.048**
(0.023) (0.022)
2 years after 0.040 0.071**
(0.026) (0.028)
3 years after 0.068** 0.137***
(0.030) (0.030)
4 years after 0.108*** 0.164***
(0.031) (0.041)
N 19441446 19555486
Grade Fixed Effects yes yes
Grade by Year Fixed Effects yes yes
School by Grade Fixed Effects yes yes
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a different regression. Observations are at the student level,
spanning 2007/08 though 2012/13 academic years. All estimates include school fixed effects, year fixed
effects, and indicator variables for the Quality Schools Program and the Secure School Program. Estimated
standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the state and grade-by-year level. Student test scores
from each exam are normalized to have mean zero and standard deviation one.
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level
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Table A.12: Estimated Effects on Dropped Observations
(1) (2) (3)
Fraction of students with: <50% Math <50% Reading Unreliable
Answers Answers Test Scores
Year of adoption -0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
1 year after -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
2 years after -0.003* -0.003 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
3 years after -0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.006)
4 years after -0.003 -0.002 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005)
N 472676 472676 472676
Notes: Each column represents a different regression. Observations are at the school level, spanning 2007/08
though 2012/13 academic years. All estimates include school fixed effects and year fixed effects. Estimated
standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level.
* Significant at the 10% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; *** Significant at the 1% level
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Figure A.10: Distribution of Normalized Math ENLACE Test Scores 2005-2012
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Notes: Each panel shows the test score distribution based on student level ENLACE Test Scores from the Ministry of Education.
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Figure A.11: Distribution of Normalized Reading ENLACE Test Scores 2005-2012
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Notes: Each panel shows the test score distribution based on student level ENLACE Test Scores from the Ministry of Education.
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A.2.1 Enrollment Effects and Bounds
Let FTEt and HTEt denote the number of students enrolled in full- and half-time
schools at school year t, respectively. And let %∆e denote the estimated effect of the FTS
program on enrollment. For the first set of bounds, I find the percentage of students that
will change treatment status, denoted by %∆′e.
Assume FTSt = HTSt. Then
FTEt+1 = (1 +
1
2
%∆e) · FTEt (A.1)
FTEt = (1 − %∆′e) · FTEt+1 (A.2)
Solving equations A.1 and A.2, the percentage of students in the treatment group that
will change treatment status is given by
%∆′e = 1 − 1
1 + 1
2
%∆e
(A.3)
For the second set of bounds, I solve for remaining percentage of students that will
change treatment status, denoted by %∆′′e.
Assume FTSt = HTSt. Then
FTEt+1 = (1 +
1
2
%∆1e) · FTEt (A.4)
FTEt+2 = (1 +
1
2
%∆2e) · FTEt (A.5)
FTEt+1 = (1 − %∆′′e) · FTEt+2 (A.6)
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Solving equations A.4 - A.6, the fraction of students in the treatment group that will
change treatment status is given by
%∆′′e = 1 − 1 +
1
2
%∆1e
1 + 1
2
%∆2e
(A.7)
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A.3 Mothers’ Labor Supply
Figure A.12: Adjusted Female Labor Outcomes for Municipalities with High and Low
Intensity of Treatment
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0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
Av
g.
 F
ra
cti
on
 o
f S
ea
ts 
in 
FT
S
15
16
17
18
19
Av
g.
 W
ee
kly
 H
ou
rs
 W
or
ke
d
2006:Q1 2008:Q1 2010:Q1 2012:Q1 2014:Q1
Time
Outcome (Top Quartile)
Outcome (Bottom Quartile)
Fraction of Seats in FTS (Top Quartile)
Fraction of Seats in FTS (Bottom Quartile)
(c) Log of Monthly Earnings
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Notes: Each panel separately shows female labor outcomes for municipalities with a high (top quartile) and
low (bottom quartile) average fraction of predicted FTS seats. The left axis shows the state-by-year-by-
quarter adjusted average of labor outcomes and the right axis the average fraction of predicted FTS seats.
Female labor outcomes are calculated based on the National Survey of Occupation and Employment (ENOE)
and the fraction of predicted seats in FTS is calculated based on census data from the Ministry of Education
in Mexico.
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Table A.13: Long-Difference Estimated Effects of the Fraction of Seats in FTS on Female
Labor Outcomes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Labor Force Participation
Fraction of seats in FTS 0.043** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.063** 0.064**
(0.021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.028)
1 Year prior -0.019 -0.019
(0.019) (0.020)
2 Years prior 0.001
(0.020)
N 166089 166089 166085 166085 166085
Panel B: Number of Weekly Hours Worked
Fraction of seats in FTS 0.261 2.352** 2.352** 2.205** 2.190**
(0.892) (0.983) (0.980) (0.993) (1.013)
1 Year prior -0.398 -0.408
(0.760) (0.804)
2 Years prior -0.036
(0.726)
N 166089 166089 166085 166085 166085
Panel C: Log of Monthly Earnings
Fraction of seats in FTS 0.338** 0.469** 0.465** 0.459** 0.445**
(0.164) (0.201) (0.201) (0.207) (0.219)
1 Year prior -0.015 -0.025
(0.139) (0.147)
2 Years prior -0.034
(0.152)
N 166089 166089 166085 166085 166085
State-by-time fixed effects no yes yes yes yes
Time-variant individual controls no no yes yes yes
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a different regression. Observations are at the indi-
vidual level, spanning from 2005:Q1 to 2015:Q3. All specifications include year-by-quarter fixed
effects. Estimated robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. In-
dividual controls include a quadratic function of age, a quadratic function of the age of the youngest
child, and a quadratic function of the number of children.
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.14: Long-Difference Estimated Effects of the Fraction of Seats in FTS on Attrition
(1) (2)
Fraction of seats in FTS 0.031 0.013
(0.045) (0.035)
N 328409 328409
Time fixed effects yes yes
State-by-time fixed effects no yes
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a different regression. Observations are at the indi-
vidual level, spanning from 2005:Q1 to 2015:Q3. Estimated robust standard errors in parentheses
are clustered at the municipality level.
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.15: Long-Difference Estimated Effects of the Fraction of Seats in FTS on Female
Labor Outcomes by Education
Years of schooling: overall 0–9 10+
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Labor Force Participation
Fraction of seats in FTS 0.070*** 0.078** 0.011
(0.026) (0.031) (0.046)
N 166085 111512 54297
Mean 0.494 0.424 0.637
Panel B: Number of Weekly Hours Worked
Fraction of seats in FTS 2.352** 2.536** 0.977
(0.980) (1.137) (1.911)
N 166085 111512 54297
Mean 16.478 14.086 21.400
Panel C: Log of Monthly Earnings
Fraction of seats in FTS 0.465** 0.479** 0.135
(0.201) (0.228) (0.542)
N 166085 111512 54297
Mean 3.101 2.550 4.232
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a different regression. Observations are at the indi-
vidual level, spanning from 2005:Q1 to 2015:Q3. All specifications include year-by-quarter fixed
effects, state-by-year-by-quarter fixed effects, and individual controls. Estimated robust standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. Individual controls include a quadratic
function of age, a quadratic function of the age of the youngest child, and a quadratic function
of the number of children. Nine years of schooling translates into completed junior high school,
which is the median education level and the compulsory level of education in Mexico.
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.16: Long-Difference Estimated Effects of the Fraction of Seats in FTS on Female
Labor Outcomes by Poverty Level of the Locality of Residence
Poverty level: overall Low Poverty High Poverty
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A: Labor Force Participation
Fraction of seats in FTS 0.070*** -0.002 0.086***
(0.026) (0.059) (0.032)
N 166085 83569 81072
Panel B: Number of Weekly Hours Worked
Fraction of seats in FTS 2.352** -0.465 3.274***
(0.980) (2.195) (1.161)
N 166085 83569 81072
Panel C: Log of Monthly Earnings
Fraction of seats in FTS 0.465** -0.214 0.630***
(0.201) (0.499) (0.233)
N 166085 83569 81072
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a different regression. Observations are at the indi-
vidual level, spanning from 2005:Q1 to 2015:Q3. All specifications include year-by-quarter fixed
effects, state-by-year-by-quarter fixed effects, and individual controls. Estimated robust standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. Individual controls include a quadratic
function of age, a quadratic function of the age of the youngest child, and a quadratic function of
the number of children. Low and high poverty localities are defined as those below and above the
median poverty index, respectively.
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Table A.17: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects on Labor Outcomes
Women Men
w/ school age w/o school age w/ school age w/o school age
children children children children
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Labor Force Participation
Fraction of seats in FTS 0.070** 0.041*** -0.022 -0.000
(0.026) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
N 166085 456755 140883 374963
Panel B: Number of Weekly Hours Worked
Fraction of seats in FTS 2.352** 0.930 0.604 -0.0391
(0.980) (0.588) (1.443) (0.928)
N 166085 456755 140883 374963
Panel C: Log of Monthly Earnings
Fraction of seats in FTS 0.465** 0.130 -0.039 0.063
(0.201) (0.116) (0.269) (0.175)
N 166085 456755 140883 374963
Notes: Each column in each panel represents a different regression. Observations are at the indi-
vidual level, spanning from 2005:Q1 to 2015:Q3. All specifications include year-by-quarter fixed
effects, state-by-year-by-quarter fixed effects, and individual controls. Estimated robust standard
errors in parentheses are clustered at the municipality level. Individual controls (only for mothers’
with children) include a quadratic function of age, a quadratic function of the age of the youngest
child, and a quadratic function of the number of children.
*, **, *** Significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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